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The Equal Access to Justice Act - Are the Bankruptcy 
Courts Less Equal than Others? 
Matthew J. Fischer 
INTRODUCTION 
In 1980, Congress passed the Equal Access to Justice Act 
(EAJA),1 which allows courts and agencies to award costs and fees, 
including attorney's fees, to parties who prevail in litigation against 
the federal government.2 In the absence of another statute specifi-
cally providing for a fee award, the BAJA mandates such an award 
unless the court finds that the government's position was substan-
tially justified or that special circumstances make such an award un-
just.3 Prior to the enactment of the BAJA, the federal government 
was immune from statutory and common law fee-shifting provisions 
1. Equal Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 96-481, tit. II, 94 Stat. 2321, 2325 (1980) 
(codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 504, 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992)). The 
EAJA provides, in relevant part: 
§ 2412 Costs and Fees · 
(a)(l) Except as otherwise specifically provided by statute, a judgment for costs, as 
enumerated in § 1920 of this title, but not including the fees and expenses of attorneys, 
may be awarded to the prevailing party in any civil action brought by or against the 
United States or any agency or any official of the United States acting in his or her 
official capacity in any court having jurisdiction of such action ...• 
(b) Unless expressly prohibited by statute, a court may award reasonable fees and 
expenses of attorneys, in addition to the costs which may be awarded pursuant to subsec-
tion (a), to the prevailing party in any civil action brought by or against the United 
States or any agency or any official of the United States acting in his or her official 
capacity in any court having jurisdiction of such action. The United States shall be liable 
for such fees and expenses to the same extent that any other party would be liable under 
the common law or under the terms of any statute which specifically provides for such an 
award .... 
(d)(l)(A) Except as otherwise specifically provided by statute, a court shall award to 
a prevailing party other than the United States fees and other expenses, in addition to 
any costs awarded pursuant to subsection (a), incurred by that party in any civil action 
(other than cases sounding in tort), including proceedings for judicial review of agency 
action, brought by or against the United States in any court having jurisdiction of that 
action, unless the court finds that the position of the United States was substantially 
justified or that special circumstances make an award unjust. .•• 
(d)(2)(F) "court" includes the United States Court of Federal Claims and the United 
States Court of Veterans Appeals .... 
28 U.S.C. § 2412 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992). , 
2. 5 U.S.C. § 504, 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (1988). A party "prevails" over the federal govern-
ment when it obtains a favorable ruling or settlement, even if it does not "prevail" on all the 
issues in the litigation. H.R. REP. No. 1418, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1980), reprinted in 1980 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4984, 4990. For two examples of prevailing parties in the bankruptcy context, 
see infra notes 23, 31. 
3. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(l)(A) (1988). 
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under the doctrine of sovereign immunity.4 The EAJA thereby 
puts the government on equal footing with nongovernment litigants 
potentially subject to fee-shifting. The EAJA grants fee-shifting au-
thority to "any court having jurisdiction of such action."5 
Courts and commentators currently dispute whether the EAJA 
grants the federal bankruptcy courts authority to shift fees against 
the federal government.6 A split between the Tenth and Eleventh 
Circuits frames the controversy. The Tenth Circuit has held that 
Congress granted EAJA authority to the bankruptcy courts,7 
whereas the Eleventh Circuit has ruled that bankruptcy courts are 
not "any court" within the meaning of the BAJA and thus cannot 
shift fees. s 
The applicability of the BAJA to the bankruptcy courts is im-
portant because the federal government is either a lender or guar-
antor of more than $870 billion in loans.9 In addition, the 
government assumes the role of creditor in many of its contractual 
relations by making progress or advance payments to contractors 
4. See Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Socy., 421 U.S. 240, 265-68 (1975). The 
statutory and common law exceptions to the "American rule" - that each party must bear 
its own legal expenses - are numerous. The American rule dictates that a prevailing litigant 
is not entitled to collect reasonable attorney's fees from the loser. 421 U.S. at 247. Although 
the Supreme Court in Alyeska rejected the "private attorney general" exception to the 
American rule in cases involving the federal government, 421 U.S. at 265-68, the Court rec-
ognized the "common fund" and bad faith exceptions to the rule. 421 U.S. at 257-59. Other 
exceptions are established by statute, including Titles II and VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a-3(b), 2000e-5{k) {1988); Title III of the Organized Crime Act, 18 
U.S.C. § 2520(b )(3) (1988); the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (1988); the Freedom of Infor-
mation Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(E) (1988); the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1973l{e) (1988); the Consumer Product Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2060(c), (f), 2072(a), 2073 
{1988); and the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1988). 
For a general discussion of the American rule and its exceptions, see Fred B. Westfall, Note, 
The Equal Access to Justice Act: How to Recover Attorneys' Fees & Litigation Expenses from 
the United States Government, 13 U. ToL. L. REv. 149, 150-55 (1981). 
5. 28 U.S.C. § 2412{a), (b) (1988) (emphasis added). 
6. The law clearly permits bankruptcy courts to shift fees and costs against private liti-
gants. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(h) {1988) (providing for award of fees for willful violation of a 
stay of actions against property); FED. R. BANKR. P. 7054 (providing for award of costs); FED. 
R. BANKR. P. 9011 (providing for sanctions including fees and costs); see also infra note 171. 
7. O'Connor v. U.S. Dept. of Energy, 942 F.2d 771-74 {10th Cir. 1991); see also Charles 
R. Haywood, Note, The Power of Bankruptcy Courts to Shift Fees under the Equal Access to 
Justice Act, 61 U. CHI. L. REv. 985 (1994). The Chicago Note was published immediately 
prior to publication of this Note; it reaches the same conclusion and addresses some of the 
arguments examined here. 
8. Gower v. Farmers Home Admin. (In re Davis), 899 F.2d 1136, 1139-40 (11th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 498 U.S. 981 {1990). 
9. As of 1992, $157 billion was owed to the United States under various direct lending 
programs. OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERN· 
MENT, F1scAL YEAR 1994, at 51 (1993). The government also had guaranteed $587 billion 
worth of outstanding loans as of 1992. Id. The federal government accounted for 18.2% of 
all lending in this country between 1987 and"l991. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTI· 
CAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 336, No. 518 {113th ed. 1993) (calculating this figure 
using a weighted average of each of the five years in question). 
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under long-term deals.10 The government also often takes title or a 
secured position in the goods being manufactured under contract, 
potentially leading to litigation if the contractor files for bank-
ruptcy.11 The likely bankruptcy of some percentage of government 
borrowers and contractors will continue to require the federal gov-
ernment to appear in the bankruptcy courts as an interested credi-
tor.12 The federal government, just like any other creditor, must 
file a proof of claim in bankruptcy to establish the priority of its 
liens.13 
Furthermore, any time a party indebted to the government files 
for bankruptcy, potential litigation issues arise regarding compli-
ance with the automatic stay, preference, and permanent injunction 
provisions of the bankruptcy code.14 The federal government, spe-
10. See, e.g., 10 U.S.C. § 2307 (1988) (authorizing military agencies to make advance pay-
ments under contracts if adequate security is obtained and the public interest is served); 41 
U.S.C. § 255 (1988) (authorizing any executive agency to make advance payments under con-
tracts if adequate security is obtained and the public interest is served); see also United States 
v. Lindberg Corp., 882 F.2d 1158 (7th Cir. 1989) (enforcing the United States' title to work-
in-progress inventory after manufacturer's insolvency); In re American Pouch Foods, Inc., 
769 F.2d 1190 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1082 (1986); United States v. Wincom 
Corp. (In re Wincom Corp.), 76 B.R. 1 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1987). In addition, the government 
finances health care providers through the Medicare program by making interim payments to 
participating providers, 42 U.S.C. § 1395g(e) (1988); 42 C.F.R. § 413.64 (1992), as well as 
estimated advances for capital expenses. 42 C.F.R. § 412.116 (1992). The government some-
times makes overpayments which might lead to litigation if the provider files for bankruptcy. 
See, e.g., University Medical Ctr. v. Sullivan (In re University Medical Ctr.), 973 F.2d 1065 
(3d Cir. 1992). 
11. The government sometimes sues the debtor for possession of the goods manufactured 
to date. See, e.g., United States v. Wincom Corp. (In re Wincom), 76 B.R. 1 (Bankr. D. Mass. 
1987); United States v. Economy Cab & Tool Co. (In re Economy Cab & Tool Co.), 47 B.R. 
708 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1985). Litigation may also arise between the government and other 
creditors of the debtor who claim the identical collateral. See, e.g., United States v. Ansonia 
Brass & Copper Co., 218 U.S. 452 (1910); First Natl. Bank of Geneva v. Biallas (In re 
Denalco Corp.), 51 B.R. 77 (Bankr. N.D. III. 1985), appeal dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, 
57 B.R. 392 (N.D. Ill. 1986). Occasionally, the government becomes simultaneously involved 
in both types of suits. See, e.g., United States Dept. of Energy v. Reynolds Mfg. Co. (In re 
Reynolds Mfg. Co.), 68 B.R. 219 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1986). 
12. The increasing prevalence of bankruptcy filings may also increase participation by the 
federal government in bankruptcy adjudications. As of March 31, 1993, 1,197,589 bankruptcy 
cases were pending. ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, FEDERAL JUDICIAL 
WORKLOAD STATISTICS, MARCH 31, 1993, at 6-7 (1993) (hereinafter WORKLOAD STATIS· 
TICS]. Although the number of cases filed during the 12 months ending on March 31, 1993, 
was 2.7% less than the prior 12 months, it was the first decrease in 10 years. Id. at 5-6 & tbl. 
5. The number of cases filed annually has increased from 623,413 in 1989 to 939,935 in 1993, 
representing a 66.3% increase over 5 years. Id. 
13. See 11 U.S.C. § 501 (1988). Although federal law determines the priority of any lien 
held by the federal government, a federal lien enjoys no automatic superiority to state liens 
held by other creditors. United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 740 (1979) 
(adopting state law to govern federal security interests). 
14. See, e.g., Gower v. Farmers Home Admin. (In re Davis), 899 F.2d 1136 (11th Cir.) 
(noting that bankruptcy court has jurisdiction over voidable preference action), cert. denied, 
498 U.S. 981 (1990); In re American Pouch Foods, Inc., 769 F.2d 1190 (7th Cir. 1985) (af-
firming government's relief from automatic stay), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1082 (1986); Inslaw, 
Inc. v. United States (In re Inslaw, Inc.), 76 B.R. 224 (Bankr. D.D.C. 1987) (referring to 
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cifically the Internal Revenue Service, is a frequent violator of the 
automatic stay15 and permanent injunction16 provisions of the 
bankruptcy code.17 The prevalence of federal lending and the in-
crease in bankruptcy filings highlight the importance of a resolution 
to the question of the EAJA's applicability to the bankruptcy 
courts.18 
This Note argues that the bankruptcy courts have authority 
under the BAJA to shift fees against the federal government. Part I 
discusses the relevant caselaw and examines the basis of the current 
controversy. Part II examines the statutory language, the legislative 
history, and the stated purposes of the BAJA and concludes that 
each of these aspects of the statute demonstrates a congressional 
intent to grant fee-shifting authority to the bankruptcy courts. Part 
III considers alternatives to finding bankruptcy court jurisdiction 
over BAJA disputes, rejecting each as inefficient and unnecessary. 
This Note concludes that courts should construe the BAJA consist-
injunctive powers of the bankruptcy court and implicating federal government for violation 
of automatic stay). 
15. After a debtor files a bankruptcy petition, the automatic stay prohibits creditors from 
continuing or commencing any action to enforce judgments, collect debts, or perfect liens 
against the property of the debtor. 11 U.S.C. § 362{a) {1988). Some legal actions against the 
debtor are not prohibited, 11 U.S.C. § 362{b) {1988), and creditors may move to have the 
stay lifted for cause. 11 U.S.C. § 362{d) (1988). 
16. The discharge of a debtor in bankruptcy acts·as an injunction against commencement 
or continuation of collection actions with regard to discharged debts against the debtor or the 
debtor's property. See 11 U.S.C. § 524{a) {1988). 
17. Due to an uncooperative computer, the IRS has not adequately controlled enforce-
ment actions against tax debtors, a shortcoming that has resulted in numerous "opportuni-
ties" for the IRS to appear before the bankruptcy· courts to try to explain its repeated 
violations of the bankruptcy code. One court observed: 
In its more than two decade-long involvement as a practitioner, professor and judge in 
the bankruptcy system, this court has never encountered a more egregious flaunting of 
the bankruptcy system as that which it has seen by the IRS in this case .... This conduct 
has only been engaged in by those in charge of the IRS's computers. 
Abernathy v. United States (In re Abernathy), 150 B.R. 688, 696 & n.10 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 
1993); see also IRS v. Germaine (In re Germaine), 152 B.R. 619, 629 {Bankr. 9th Cir. 1993) 
{letters and calls from IRS violating permanent injunction blamed on " 'computer error' "); 
Nichols v. IRS (In re Nichols), 143 B.R. 104, 108 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1992) {"Multiple and 
egregious violations of the automatic stay go uncompensated, merely because the IRS is the 
violator."); In re Solis, 137 B.R. 121, 123 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1992) (violation of automatic stay 
due to computer failure); United States v. Fernandez (In re Fernandez), 125 B.R. 317, 318 
(Bankr. M.D. Fla.), affd., 132 B.R. 775 (M.D. Fla. 1991), revd., 94 T.N.T. 63-11 (M.D. Fla. 
1994); Cowart v. IRS (In re Cowart), 128 B.R. 492, 497 {Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1990); In re Price, 
103 B.R. 989, 992 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1989), affd., 130 B.R. 259 {N.D. Ill. 1991); In re Shafer, 63 
B.R. 194, 198 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1986); In re Conti, 50 B.R. 142, 144 {Bankr. E.D. Va. 1985); In 
re Newlin, 29 B.R. 781, 784 (E.D. Pa. 1983). 
18. Despite the small decrease in bankruptcy filings, adversary proceedings are being 
brought faster than the bankruptcy courts can adjudicate them. As of March 31, 1993, 
138,907 adversary proceedings were pending in the bankruptcy courts, a 24.1 % increase from 
the prior year. WORKLOAD STATISTICS, supra note 12, app. tbl. F-8, at 85. In the 12 months 
prior to March 31, 1993, 100,412 adversary proceedings were filed and 73,449 were disposed 
of meaning there is over a one-year backlog in the bankruptcy courts for adversary proceed-
ings. Id. See also supra note 12. 
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ently with its language, history, and purpose, and allow the bank-
ruptcy courts to shift fees and costs against the federal government 
in appropriate cases. 
I. THE CURRENT STATE OF THE CONTROVERSY 
Although three circuit courts have decided cases presenting the 
issue of whether the bankruptcy courts may shift fees under the au-
thority of the EAJA, only two have explicitly addressed the issue of 
jurisdiction.19 In O'Connor v. United States Department of En-
ergy,20 the Tenth Circuit held that bankruptcy courts could exercise 
EAJA power because they fall within the EAJA's jurisdictional 
grant to "any court." The Eleventh Circuit, however, concluded 
otherwise in Gower v. Farmers Home Administration (In re 
Davis),21 holding that the bankruptcy courts cannot exercise EAJA 
power because they are not "courts of the United States" as defined 
in 28 U.S.C. § 451.22 This Part examines the position of each circuit 
in detail to set the stage for the comprehensive analysis of bank-
ruptcy court jurisdiction under the EAJA in Part II. 
A. The Tenth Circuit Position - O'Connor 
The Tenth Circuit, in O'Connor v. United States Department of 
Energy, 23 held that a bankruptcy court may shift fees under the 
19. O'Connor v. United States Dept. of Energy, 942 F.2d 771 {10th Cir. 1991); Gower v. 
Farmers Home Admin. (In re Davis), 899 F.2d 1136 {11th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 
981 (1990). In United States Small Business Admin. v. Esmond (In re Esmond), 752 F.2d 
1106 (5th Cir. 1985), the Fifth Circuit remanded the case to the bankruptcy court in order to 
give the parties an opportunity to present their evidence on the issue of the government's 
alleged substantial justification for its position. 752 F.2d at 1109. The appellate court appar-
ently presumed that bankruptcy courts have authority to shift fees under the EAJA because 
it remanded the case for an evaluation of a defense to the claim for fees. 752 F.2d at 1109. 
This decision lends some credence to the argument that the plain meaning of the statute is 
clear. See infra section 11.A.1. The Esmond case, however, lends only nominal support be-
cause the Esmond court did not explicitly consider whether the bankruptcy courts have juris-
diction under the EAJA. 
20. 942 F.2d 771 {10th Cir. 1991). 
21. 899 F.2d 1136 {11th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 981 {1990). 
22. Section 451, titled "Definitions," provides: 
The term "court of the United States" includes the Supreme Court of the United States, 
courts of appeals, district courts constituted by chapter 5 of this title, including the Court 
of International Trade and any court created by Act of Congress the judges of which are 
entitled to hold office during good behavior. 
28 U.S.C. § 451 (1988). This definition excludes the bankruptcy courts, which are constituted 
by chapter 6 of title 28. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 81-144, 151-58 {1988). 
23. 942 F.2d 771 {10th Cir. 1991). In O'Connor, the Department of Energy filed a motion 
to enforce a reorganization plan and, alternatively, to convert the bankruptcy from a chapter 
11 reorganization to a chapter 7 liquidation. 942 F.2d at 772. The bankruptcy court denied 
the motion and awarded attorney's fees under the EAJA to the prevailing party, O'Connor. 
942 F.2d at 772. The district court reversed the award, relying on Gower v. Farmers Home 
Admin. (In re Davis), 899 F.2d 1136 {11th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 981 (1990), See infra 
section I.B. The debtor appealed. 942 F.2d at 772. 
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BAJA because bankruptcy courts fall within the plain meaning of 
"any court"24 and because the inclusion of bankruptcy courts fur-
thers BAJA policies.25 The O'Connor court relied on its interpreta-
tion of the "plain meaning" of the EAJA, invoking the general 
principle that "[a] court should venture into the thicket of legisla-
tive history only when necessary to determine 'a statutory purpose 
obscured by ambiguity.' "26 The O'Connor court held that the plain 
meaning of "any court" includes the bankruptcy courts.27 
The O'Connor court also noted that Congress could have modi-
fied the term "any court" if it had intended to limit the jurisdic-
tional reach of the BAJA to a specific subset of courts.28 The court 
reasoned that the unmodified use of court supported its view that 
the plain meaning of "any court" included the bankruptcy courts.29 
In further support of its textual analysis, the O'Connor court also 
stated that its conclusion comports with the general purpose of the 
EAJA, namely to encourage citizens to challenge unreasonable 
government action despite the high cost of litigation.3o 
B. The Eleventh Circuit Position - In re Davis 
In Gower v. Farmers Home Administration (In re Davis),31 the 
Eleventh Circuit held that the bankruptcy courts lack authority 
under the BAJA to shift fees because they are not "any court" 
within the meaning of the BAJA.32 The Davis court relied on two 
24. O'Connor, 942 F.2d at 773. 
25. 942 F.2d at 774. 
26. 942 F.2d at 773 (quoting Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Oklahoma Tax Commn., 481 U.S. 
454, 461 (1987)). 
27. 942 F.2d at 773. 
28. 942 F.2d at 773. 
29. 942 F.2d at 773-74. 
30. 942 F.2d at 774. 
31. 899 F.2d 1136 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 981 (1990). Davis, the debtor, bor-
rowed $985,000 from the Farmers Home Administration {FmHA) and subsequently filed 
bankruptcy. 899 F.2d at 1137. Gower, the trustee, tried to recover payments made to the 
FmHA as preferential transfers under § 547{b) of the bankruptcy code. 899 F.2d at 1137 
(construing 11 U.S.C. § 547(b), (c) {1988)). The bankruptcy court found the FmHA's con-
duct misleading toward other creditors, ordered the return of the payments, and equitably 
subordinated FmHA's claims. 899 F.2d at 1137. The trustee was therefore a prevailing party 
and the bankruptcy court awarded EAJA fees. The FmHA appealed. 899 F.2d at 1138. 
32. 899 F.2d at 1138-42. The court also held that a bankruptcy trustee is not a "party," 
899 F.2d at 1142-45, defined in the EAJA as: 
i) an individual whose net worth did not exceed $2,000,000 at the time the civil action 
was filed, or 
ii) any owner of an unincorporated business, or any partnership, corporation, associa-
tion, unit of local government, or organization, the net worth of which did not exceed 
$7,000,000 at the time the civil action was filed, and which had not more than 500 em-
ployees at the time the civil action was filed. 
28 U.S.C. § 2412{d){2){B) (1988). Because the Eleventh Circuit held that the trustee is not a 
party, it found the trustee ineligible to receive an award. 899 F.2d at 1145. Although the 
dispute surrounding the proper definition of "party" within the EAJA is beyond the scope of 
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sources to support its denial of jurisdiction: the precedent of 
Bowen v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue33 and the legislative 
history of the EAJA.34 
In Bowen, the Eleventh Circuit h.eld that the tax courts did not 
have jurisdiction to award BAJA fees to a prevailing party, relying 
on cross-references within title 28 and the unique position of the tax 
courts under title 26.35 The Bowen court first noted that the BAJA 
allowed recovery of the "costs" enumerated in section 1920 of title 
28.36 Section 1920 is entitled "Taxation of Costs" and partially codi-
fies the equitable power of the federal courts.37 The Bowen court 
then noted that section 1920 states that costs may be shifted by a 
"court of the United States,"38 a term that is defined in 28 U.S.C. 
§ 451.39 The court reasoned that the EAJA's reference to the costs 
enumerated in section 1920 also incorporated section 1920's juris-
dictional limitation to "courts of the United States" as defined by 
section 451.40 Therefore, the Bowen court held that BAJA fees 
this Note, this footnote addresses the issue briefly because the jurisdictional authority of the 
bankruptcy courts to shift EAJA fees is of practical importance only if bankruptcy trustees 
are "parties" eligible to receive EAJA awards. The Davis court held that a trustee in bank· 
ruptcy is not an eligible party to receive an EAJA award because the trustee did not fit 
comfortably into the court's conception of "organization." 899 F.2d at 1144. The Eleventh 
Circuit, however, subsequently limited that part of the Davis holding to Chapter 7 trustees. 
In re Brickell Inv. Corp., 922 F.2d 696, 702-03 (11th Cir. 1991). Because, at a minimum, 
Chapter 11 debtors in possession are eligible parties to receive awards, it is important to 
establish the authority of the bankruptcy court to make EAJA awards. 
The Davis court also argued that the difficulty in applying the EAJA's net-worth and 
number-of-employees tests, see 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(B) (1988), to bankruptcy trustees mil-
itates towards finding trustees outside the definition of "party" under the EAJA. 899 F.2d at 
1144 n.18. For the purposes of this Note, it is sufficient to recognize that the net-worth and 
number-of-employees tests apply only to parties seeking mandatory awards under§ 2412(d) 
and not to those seeking discretionary awards under§ 2412(b). See American Hosp. Assn. v. 
Sullivan, 938 F.2d 216, 219 (D.C. Cir. 1991). 
For further analysis of the definition of "party" under the EAJA, see National nuck 
Equip. Assn. v. National Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 972 F.2d 669 (6th Cir. 1992); Love 
v. Reilly, 924 F.2d 1492 (9th Cir. 1991); American Assn. of Retired Persons v. EEOC, 873 
F.2d 402 (D.C. Cir. 1989); Louisiana ex rel Guste v. Lee, 853 F.2d 1219 (5th Cir. 1988); 
Unification Church v. INS, 762 F.2d 1077 (D.C. Cir. 1985); 46 Fed. Reg. 32,900, 32,912 (1981); 
Ralph V. Seep, Annotation, Who is "Party" Entitled to Recover Attorneys' Fees Under Equal 
Access to Justice Act (28 U.S.C.S. § 2412(d)), 107 A.L.R. FED. 827 (1992). 
33. 706 F.2d 1087 (11th Cir. 1983). 
34. Davis, 899 F.2d at 1138-40. 
35. Bowen, 706 F.2d at 1088. 
36. Bowen, 106 F.2d at 1088. The EAJA provides, "judgment for costs, as enumerated in 
§ 1920 of this title ... may be awarded .... " 28 U.$.C. § 2412(a) (1988). 
37. 28 U.S.C. § 1920 (1988); see Sprague v. Ticonic Natl. Bank, 307 U.S. 161, 164-65 
(1939). The equitable power of the federal courts also allows courts to award attorney's fees 
to a litigant. See Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32 (1991) (affirming an award of attor· 
ney's fees based on the "inherent power" of a federal court). 
38. Section 1920 states, "A judge or clerk of any court of the United States may tax as 
costs the following ... (listing costs]." 28 U.S.C. § 1920 (1988). 
39. See supra note 22. 
40. Bowen, 706 F.2d at 1088. 
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may be shifted only by courts listed in section 451,41 even though 
the EAJA contains no explicit reference to section 451. Because 
section 451 does not include the tax courts, the Eleventh Circuit 
concluded that the tax courts lack EAJA authority.42 In Davis, the 
court held that the analysis of Bowen applied "unambiguously" to 
bankruptcy courts, which are also not included in section 451.43 
In addition to the statutory cross-referencing analysis adopted 
from the Bowen opinion, the Davis court also relied on a portion of 
the legislative history of the EAJA to exclude the bankruptcy 
courts from BAJA jurisdiction.44 The court quoted House Report 
1418, which states: 
Section 2412(b) [of the EAJA] permits a court in its discretion to 
award attorney fees and other expenses to prevailing parties in civil 
litigation involving the United States to the same extent it may award 
fees in cases involving other parties. The courts so empowered are 
those defined in section 451 of title 28, United States Code.45 
This document plainly appears to restriet the courts eligible to shift 
BAJA fees to those enumerated in section 451. The Davis court 
buttressed its statutory argument with this seemingly unequivocal 
legislative history to hold that the bankruptcy courts lacked juris-
diction to award fees under the EAJA.46 
The circuit split defines the current state of the law on the bank-
ruptcy court jurisdiction issue. Because the Tenth Circuit refused to 
examine the legislative history in House Report 1418 that appears 
to limit EAJA jurisdiction to the "courts of the United States" 
listed in section 451, evidence that the Eleventh Circuit considered 
probative, the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits simply argue past each 
other. No other courts have directly addressed the issue of bank-
ruptcy court jurisdiction under the EAJA.47 As a result, the bank-
41. 706 F.2d at 1088. 
42. 706 F.2d at 1088. 
43. Gower v. Farmers Home Admin. (In re Davis), 899 F.2d 1136, 1139 (11th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 498 U.S. 981 {1990). 
44. Davis, 899 F.2d at 1139. 
45. 899 F.2d at 1139 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 1418, supra note 2, at 17, reprinted in 1980 
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4996) (alteration in original). This statement, although describing subsec-
tion {b) of § 2412, informs the analysis of subsection {d) because of the similarity in the 
phrasing of the jurisdiction granting language in each subsection. Subsection (b) grants fee 
shifting authority to "any court having jurisdiction of such action," 28 U.S.C. § 2412{b) 
{1988), which is nearly identical to the grant of subsection {d), which provides authority to 
"any court having jurisdiction of that action," 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d){l)(A) (1988). According 
to this piece of legislative history, it seems that EAJA power, in both subsections (b) and ( d), 
is limited to the "courts of the United States" enumerated in § 451 of title 28. 
46. 899 F.2d at 1140. 
47. One bankruptcy court has awarded EAJA fees without consideration of the jurisdic-
tion question. Hagan v. Heckler (In re Hagan), 44 B.R. 59 (Bankr. D. R.I. 1984). Another 
bankruptcy court reached the merits of an EAJA dispute without discussion of the jurisdic-
tion question. In re Parks, 84-2 U.S. Tax Cas. {CCH) 'lI 9744 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1984). In 
United States Small Business Admin. v. Esmond (In re Esmond), 752 F.2d 1106 (5th Cir. 
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ruptcy courts are left without clear or consistent guidance on this 
issue. 
II. INTERPRETING THE EAJA 
Part I concluded that the current disagreement in the courts 
over whether the EAJA grants the bankruptcy courts authority to 
shift fees against the federal government reflects fundamentally dif-
ferent approaches to the question. This Part provides a comprehen-
sive assessment of the arguments on either side, arguing that the 
EAJA's text, legislative history, and purposes support the conclu-
sion that the statute includes the bankruptcy courts.48 Section II.A 
argues that the plain meaning of the statute's jurisdictional grant 
covers the bankruptcy courts. This section also considers and re-
1985), the Fifth Circuit assumed that the bankruptcy courts had jurisdiction to adjudicate 
EAJA disputes. See supra note 19. 
Courts have addressed bankruptcy court jurisdiction under 26 U.S.C. § 7430, the tax 
counterpart to the EAJA, which allows courts to award litigation costs to parties that prevail 
against the federal government in connection with the determination, collection, or refund of 
any tax under title 26. 26 U.S.C. § 7430 (1988). The EAJA is the model for 26 U.S.C. § 7430, 
United States v. Germaine (In re Germaine), 152 B.R. 619, 625 n.6 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1993), 
but § 7430 supplants the EAJA for cases arising under the tax law. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(e) 
(1988); Grewe v. United States (In re Grewe), 4 F.3d 299, 301 (4th Cir. 1993); Germaine, 152 
B.R. at 625 n.6. The EAJA and § 7430 have been and should be interpreted consistently. See 
Powell v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 791 F.2d 385, 390 (5th Cir. 1986) ("Absent 
some compelling reason to read the analogous phrases in the two statutes differently, they 
should be interpreted consistently."). The main distinction in the respective grants of juris-
diction is that the EAJA grants jurisdiction to "any court," see 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(l)(A) 
(1988), while § 7430 allows only a "court of the United States" to shift fees. See 26 U.S.C. 
§ 7430(c)(6) (1988). 
One would therefore expect courts to be less likely to allow bankruptcy courts to award 
§ 7430 fees than EAJA fees because bankruptcy courts are not "courts of the United States" 
as that term is defined in 28 U.S.C. § 451 (1988). Many courts, however, have interpreted 
§ 7430 to include the bankruptcy courts within the "courts of the United States." See Ger-
maine, 152 B.R. at 619; Abernathy v. United States (In re Abernathy), 150 B.R. 688 (Bankr. 
N.D. Ill. 1993); Kreidle v. Department of Treasury, IRS (In re Kreidle), 145 B.R. 1007 
(Bankr. D. Colo. 1992); In re Chambers, 140 B.R. 233 (N.D. Ill. 1992). Bllt see In re Brickell 
Inv. Corp., 922 F.2d 696, 696-97 {11th Cir. 1991) (holding that the bankruptcy court was not 
able to shift fees under § 7430 because it was not a "court of the United States"); United 
States v. Yochum (In re Yochum), 156 B.R. 816 (D. Nev. 1993) (holding that the bankruptcy 
courts are not courts of the United States for the purposes of § 7430). Other courts have 
assumed without discussion that the bankruptcy courts have jurisdiction under § 7430. See 
Graham v. United States (In re Graham), 981F2d1135, 1139 (10th Cir. 1992); United States 
v. McPeck, 910 F.2d 509 (8th Cir. 1990) (remanding to bankruptcy court for a factual deter-
mination under § 7430 and thus assuming authority without discussion); /ti re Robidoux, 116 
B.R. 320 (D. Mass. 1990) (remanding to the bankruptcy court for a determination of whether 
the amount of a§ 7430 award was appropriate); Samore v. Olson (In re Olson), 100 B.R. 458 
(Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1989) (reaching the merits of a § 7430 claim without discussing jurisdic-
tion), affd., 121 B.R. 346 (N.D. Iowa 1990), affd., 930 F.2d 6 (8th Cir. 1991). 
48. The importance of each of these methods of statutory interpretation is emphasized by 
the fact that the Supreme Court has recently relied on each one to interpret the EAJA. See 
Ardestani v. INS, 112 S. Ct. 515, 519-20 (1991) (relying on the plain language of the EAJA); 
Sullivan v. Hudson, 490 U.S. 877, 883 (1989) (relying on the legislative history as evidence of 
the EAJA's purpose); Commissioner of the INS v. Jean, 496 U.S. 154, 164·65 (1990) (relying 
on the purpose of EAJA). 
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jects arguments based on cross-references from the EAJA to other 
statutes. Section Il.B argues that the EAJA's legislative history, 
though complicated, supports the plain meaning of the text. Fi-
nally, section Il.C demonstrates that including bankruptcy courts 
within BAJA jurisdiction advances the purposes of the statute, 
which provides further evidence of congressional intent to include 
the bankruptcy courts. 
A. The Textual Meaning of the EAJA 
Any statutory construction must begin with the language of the 
statute.49 The language of the BAJA provides in relevant part: 
Except as otherwise specifically provided by statute, a court shall 
award to a prevailing party other than the United States fees and 
other expenses, in addition to any costs awarded pursuant to subsec-
tion (a), incurred by that party in any civil action (other than cases 
sounding in tort), including proceedings for judicial review of agency 
action, brought by or against the United States in any court having 
jurisdiction of that action, unless the court finds that the position of 
the United States was substantially justified or that special circum-
stances make an award unjust.50 
Section II.A.1 discusses the language of the BAJA, concluding that 
"any court" plainly includes the bankruptcy courts. Section II.A.2 
considers the argument based on a cross-reference to the definition 
of a "court of the United States" and concludes that the language of 
BAJA does not limit the statute's scope to those courts. 
1. The Plain Language of the EAJA 
According to the plain language of the EAJA, the bankruptcy 
courts should have the ability to shift fees against the federal gov-
ernment. The text of the BAJA grants jurisdiction over BAJA peti-
tions to "any court." According to its plain and ordinary meaning, 
the term court means" '[a] person or group of persons whose task 
is to hear and submit a decision on cases at law.' "51 By this defini-
tion, bankruptcy courts are courts and therefore should be covered 
by the BAJA's grant of authority to "any court."52 
In addition, the phrase "any court" is unmodified in the BAJA, 
even though Congress could have used the more restrictive "court 
of the United States" if Congress had intended "any court" to mean 
49. Ardestani v. INS, 112 S. Ct. 515, 519 (1991) (quoting United States v. James, 478 U.S. 
597, 604 (1986) (quoting Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 756 (1975) 
(Powell, J., concurring))); United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 580 (1981). 
50. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(l)(A) (1988) (emphasis added). 
51. O'Connor v. United States Dept. of Energy, 942 F.2d 771, 773 (10th Cir. 1991) (quot-
ing WEBSTER'S II NEw RlvERSIDE UNIVERSITY DICTIONARY 320 (Anne H. Soukhanov et al. 
eds., 1984)). 
52. See 942 F.2d at 773. 
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some subset of all federal courts.53 Congress's failure to modify 
"any court" further indicates a broad textual grant of authority to 
any court properly adjudicating a civil action. 
2. Cross-References to the Definition of "Courts of the United 
States" 
An alternative textual analysis potentially conflicts with the re-
sult obtained by simply following the plain meaning of court. The 
Eleventh Circuit has relied on cross-references within title 28 to 
hold that the EAJA grants fee-shifting authority only to those 
courts listed in section 451 of title 28.54 This statutory construction 
was introduced in Bowen v. Commissioner,55 and followed in 
Gower v. Farmers Home Administration (In re Davis).56 The 
Bowen court transformed the EAJA's incorporation of the costs 
enumerated in se.ction 1920 into an adoption of the jurisdictional 
requirement of section 1920.57 
·The EAJA's reference to section 1920, however, does not sup-
port the inference that the EAJA incorporates section 1920's juris-
dictional limitation. First, the EAJA states only that "a judgment 
for costs, as enumerated in section 1920 ... may be awarded."58 
The EAJA makes no reference to section 1920's jurisdictional 
limit.59 
Second, this cross-referencing construction leads to an incongru-
ous BAJA. The BAJA grants fee-shifting authority not only to 
"any court" with subject matter jurisdiction,6° but also to "[a]n 
agency that conducts an adversary adjudication."61 It is unlikely 
that Congress intended to grant fee-shifting authority to the courts 
listed in section 451 as well as to all the agencies that conduct ad-
versarial hearings yet intended to withhold that authority from the 
53. See 942 F.2d at 773-74. Congress uses the phrase "court of the United States" to limit 
the term "courts" to those listed in 28 U.S.C. § 451 (1988). Cf. 2 U.S.C. § 130b(a)(2) (1988); 
5 U.S.C. § 5537(c) (1988); 10 U.S.C. § 1408(a)(l) (1988); 28 U.S.C. §§ 373(f), 1920 (1988). 
The O'Connor court also noted that Congress could have modified "any court" with "consti-
tutional" if Congress intended such a restriction. O'Connor, 942 F.2d at 773. 
54. See supra section I.B. 
55. 706 F.2d 1087 (11th Cir. 1983). 
56. 899 F.2d 1136 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 981 (1990). 
57. See supra notes 35-42 and accompanying text. 
58. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(a) (1988) (emphasis added). The costs enumerated in§ 1920 include 
fees of the clerk and court reporter, printing fees, witness fees, docket fees, and compensa-
tion for court-appointed experts. 28 U.S.C. § 1920 (1988). 
59. See 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (1988). The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit noted this 
point in Essex Electro Engineers, Inc., v. United States Dept. of Energy, 757 F.2d 247 (Fed. 
Cir. 1985), stating, "[W)e construe [the EAJA reference to § 1920) as delineating the kinds of 
costs that can be awarded - not the kinds of courts having jurisdiction over EAJA applica-
tions." 757 F.2d at 251. 
60. See 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(l)(A) (1988). 
61. See 5 U.S.C. § 504(a)(l) (1988). 
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bankruptcy courts. To the contrary, the grant of authority to ad-
ministrative agencies belies any congressional intent to limit BAJA 
jurisdiction to the supposedly more qualified and prestigious 
"courts of the United States." The inclusion of administrative agen-
cies makes clear Congress's intent to provide comprehensive relief 
to citizens besieged by unreasonable government action.62 
Third, Congress would presumably have included important ju-
risdictional limitations to the BAJA in the BAJA itself, rather than 
squirrel them away in section 1920. Careful examination of the 
BAJA subsections exposes the tenuous nature of the link between 
section 1920's jurisdictional limitation and the BAJA. The passage 
of the BAJA altered the existing law,63 extending the common law 
exceptions to the American rule to the federal government by cre-
ating subsection (b) of section 2412.64 In addition, the BAJA pro-
vides in section 2412's new subsection (d) that if the 
nongovernment party prevails, the government must demonstrate 
that its actions were substantially justified in order to avoid paying 
that party's litigation costs.65 On the other hand, in amending sub-
section (a) of section 2412, the BAJA merely restates the law prior 
to the EAJA, under which courts could transfer costs other than 
attorney's fees as an exercise of equitable power.66 The reference 
to section 1920 in the new subsection (a) simply distinguishes the 
costs a court could shift against the government under section 2412 
prior to the BAJA from the new fee-shifting authority granted by 
the BAJA. Subsections (b) and (d) do not refer to section 1920.67 
If Congress intended section 1920 to do more than just enumerate 
the kind of costs that could be transferred under subsection (a) of 
section 2412 - that is, if Congress intended actually to limit the 
definition of "any court" in subsections (b) and ( d) - these subsec-
62. The Davis court recognized the incongruity of including administrative agencies but 
excluding bankruptcy courts, but held itself bound to this construction by the Bowen holding. 
Gower v. Farmers Home Admin. (In re Davis), 899 F.2d 1136, 1140 n.7 (11th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 498 U.S. 981 (1990). 
63. See H.R. REP. No. 1418, supra note 2, at 17-19, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 
4996-98. 
64. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(b) (1988); see H.R. REP. No. 1418, supra note 2, at 9, reprinted in 
1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4987. 
65. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d) (1988); see H.R. REP. No~ 1418, supra note 2, at 9-10, reprinted in 
1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4987-88; H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 1434, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 25-26, re-
printed in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5003, 5014-15. 
66. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(a) (1988); see H.R. REP. No. 1418, supra note 2, at 17, reprinted in 
1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4996 ("Section 2412(a) preserves the law of the existing section 2412 
.•.. "). The prior law was stated in 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (1976), and interpreted in Natural 
Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA, 484 F.2d 1331, 1334-35 (1st Cir. 1973) (stating that 
§ 2412 waives the government's sovereign immunity with respect to costs but not attorney's 
fees). 
67. See 28 U.S.C. § 2412(b), (d) (1988). 
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tions would likely include the same reference to section 1920 found 
in subsection (a). 
The reference to the costs enumerated in section 1920 was taken 
from the statute that' the EAJA replaced and was preserved in sec-
tion 2412(a). The predecessor statute, An Act to Provide for Judg-
ments for Costs Against the United States,68 stated, "costs, as 
enumerated in section 1920 of this title ... may be awarded ... in 
any court having jurisdiction of such action."69 The legislative his-
tory to the EAJA's predecessor even more clearly demonstrates 
that Congress intended the reference to section 1920 only to enu-
merate the costs that could be awarded under the statute, not to 
attach the restrictive jurisdiction of section 1920. The Senate Re-
port states: "The costs which are referred to in this bill are listed in 
section 1920 of title 28, United States Code .... "70 As in the 
EAJA, no mention is made of section 1920 with respect to 
jurisdiction.11 
This analysis demonstrates that in order to argue that the juris-
dictional requirement of section 1920 limits section 2412(b) and 
2412(d), one must presume that Congress meant to limit EAJA ju-
risdiction indirectly - by first attaching the jurisdiction of section 
1920 to section 2412(a) and then extending the supposed jurisdic-
tional limit of subsection (a) to subsections (b) and (d). A simpler 
interpretation of the reference to section 1920 - and one better 
supported by the textual and historical record - is that it provides 
a shorthand delineation of the types of costs courts have historically 
been able to award to preserve equitable treatment of all parties. 
The argument put forth by the Eleventh Circuit that the bankruptcy 
courts lack EAJA authority because they are not listed in section 
451 is therefore incorrect because it conflicts with the plain meaning 
of the EAJA, it leads to incongruous results, and it rests on a 
strained interpretation of the statutory structure. 
Although the text of the EAJA plainly appears to grant the 
bankruptcy courts the authority to shift fees, courts and commenta-
tors disagree as to the sufficiency of a purely textual approach. The 
Supreme Court, for example, recently looked beyond the plain 
meaning of a statute to its "purposes and origins" in order to deter-
mine its meaning.72 Others, however, including most notably Jus-
68. Act of July 18, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-507, 80 Stat. 308, amended by Equal Access to 
Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 96-481, tit. II, 94 Stat. 2321, 2325 (1980). 
69. Act of July 18, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-507, 80 Stat. 308, 308, amended by Equal Access 
to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 96-481, tit. II, 94 Stat. 2321, 2325 (1980). 
70. S. REP. No. 1329, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1966), reprinted in 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2527, 
2529. 
71. Id., reprinted in 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2527. 
72. See Public Citizen v. United States Dept. of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 455 (1989). The 
Court, faced with a dispute over the meaning of the word "utilized" in the Federal Advisory 
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tice Scalia, argue that textual plain meaning is a sufficient method 
for statutory analysis.73 Because courts are sometimes reluctant to 
rely solely on the plain meaning of a statute,74 and in order to avoid 
the skepticism that exclusive reliance on plain meaning sometimes 
engenders,75 the next two sections examine the history and pur-
poses of the BAJA. 
B. The Legislative History of the EAJA 
Congress has amended the BAJA several times since enacting it 
in 1980.76 This section investigates the legislative history of both 
the original passage of the BAJA and the subsequent amendments 
which affect the BAJA's definition of "any court," and concludes 
that Congress originally intended to grant EAJA jurisdiction to the 
bankruptcy courts and that subsequent amendments did not under-
mine that intent. This section reconciles the broad language of the 
BAJA, granting fee-shifting authority to "any court" having subject 
matter jurisdiction over the substantive issue before the court, with 
House Report 1418 which stipulates that "[t]he courts so empow-
ered [to exercise EAJA authority] are those defined in section 451 
of title 28, United States Code."77 Section 11.B.1 discusses the legis-
lative history behind the passage of the EAJA in 1980, and section 
11.B.2 considers the subsequent amendments to the EAJA. 
Committee Act, Pub. L. No. 92-463, 86 Stat. 770 (1972) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. app. 
(1988 & Supp. V 1993)), noted that" 'reliance on the plain language of [the statute] alone is 
not entirely satisfactory.' " 491 U.S. at 452 (quoting Washington Legal Foundation v. United 
States Dept. of Justice, 691 F. Supp. 483, 488 (D.D.C. 1988)). The Court then considered the 
context of the statute's enactment and its legislative history as provided in congressional 
committee reports. 491 U.S. at 455-62. 
73. See Union Bank v. Wolas, 112 S. Ct. 527, 534 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice 
Scalia wrote, 
I join the opinion of the Court ... which respond[s] persuasively to the legislative-
history and policy arguments made by respondent. It is regrettable that we have a legal 
culture in which such arguments have to be addressed (and are indeed credited by a 
Court of Appeals) .... [T]he plain text of the statute should have made this litigation 
unnecessary and unmaintainable. 
112 S. Ct. at 534. 
74. See Wolas, 112 S. Ct. at 530-33; Public Citizen, 491 U.S. at 455; United States v. Amer-
ican Trucking Assns., 310 U.S. 534, 543-44 (1940) ("When aid to construction of the meaning 
of words, as used in the statute, is available, there certainly can be no 'rule of law' which 
forbids its use, however clear the words may appear on 'superficial examination.'"). 
75. One commentator has written: 
Judges also frequently command respect for the statutory text by declaring that its "plain 
meaning" must govern. However, we encounter the formula often in contexts where it 
seems invoked to avoid acknowledging judges' policy preferences. We are entitled to 
regard it with some skepticism as a reliable canon of judicial self-restraint. 
JAMES w. HURST, DEALING WITH STATUTES 51 {1982). 
76. See Act of Oct. 29, 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-572, §§ 301{a), 502(b), 506(a), 106 Stat. 
4491, 4511, 4512, 4513; Act of Aug. 5, 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-80, §§ 2, 6, 99 Stat. 183, 184-86, 
186; Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248, § 292(c), 96 Stat. 
324, 574. 
77. H.R REP. No. 1418, supra note 2. 
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1. Enactment of the EAJA 
Understanding the historical context of the enactment of the 
EAJA is crucial to understanding the statute's relationship to the 
bankruptcy courts. When Congress enacted the BAJA in 1980,78 
the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 (BRA) controlled the jurisdic-
tion of the bankruptcy courts.79 Congress passed the BAJA during 
a statutory "transition period" between the old bankruptcy system 
and the system created by the BRA.80 Different sections of the 
BRA became effective at varying points throughout the transition 
period. 81 Congress repealed the BRA before it became fully effec-
tive. 82 Section 241 of the BRA gave the bankruptcy courts all the 
jurisdiction of the district courts with respect to title 11 cases and 
proceedings.s3 This "pass-through" jurisdiction was in place when 
the EAJA was enacted in 1980.84 It is undisputed that a district 
78. Public Law 96-481, which included the EAJA, was enacted on October 21, 1980. See 
126 CoNG. REC. 29227 (1980). 
79. See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549, 2668 (codified 
at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1471-1482 (Supp. IV 1980)). 
80. Some provisions of the BRA were effective immediately upon enactment, see Bank-
ruptcy Reform Act of1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 402(d), 92 Stat. 2549, 2682, while the effec-
tive date of other sections was as late as April 1, 1984, see Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 
Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 402(b), 92 Stat. 2549, 2682. The interim period is known as the "transi-
tion period." Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 404(b), 92 Stat. 2549, 
2683. 
81. See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 402, 92 Stat. 2549, 2682 
(providing the different effective dates for the different BRA sections). 
82. See Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, 
§ 113, 98 Stat. 333 (codified at scattered sections of 11 U.S.C. and 28 U.S.C.). 
83. Section 241 of the BRA defined the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy courts as follows: 
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, the district courts shall have 
original and exclusive jurisdiction of all cases under title 11. 
(b) Notwithstanding any Act of Congress that confers exclusive jurisdiction on a 
court or courts other than the district courts, the district courts shall have original but 
not exclusive jurisdiction of all civil proceedings arising under title 11 or arising in or 
related to cases under title 11. 
(c) The bankruptcy court for the district in which a case under title 11 is commenced 
shall exercise all of the jurisdiction conferred by this section on the district courts. 
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, § 241, 28 U.S.C. § 1471 (Supp. IV 1980) (amended 1984) 
(emphasis added). 
84. Section 241 of the BRA was not effective until April 1, 1984. See Bankruptcy Reform 
Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 402(b), 92 Stat. 2549, 2682. The bankruptcy courts, how-
ever, were allowed to exercise the increased jurisdiction of their successors for cases com-
menced during the transition period as follows: 
(a) All cases commenced under title 11 of the United States Code during the transition 
period shall be referred to the [transition] United States bankruptcy judges. The [transi-
tion] United States bankruptcy judges may exercise in such cases the jurisdiction and 
powers conferred by subsection (b) of this section on the [new] courts of bankruptcy .••. 
(b) During the transition period, the amendments made by section[ ] 241 ..• of this Act 
shall apply to the [transitional] courts of bankruptcy ... the same as such amendments 
apply to the [new] United States bankruptcy courts established under ... this Act. 
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 405(a)(b ), 92 Stat. 2549, 2685. Section 
241 was to give the new bankruptcy courts power, in title 11 cases, to exercise all jurisdiction 
conferred on the district courts. See supra note 83 and accompanying text. Section 405, by 
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court may exercise BAJA authority in a case related to title 11.85 
Therefore, when Congress granted the district courts the power to 
shift fees under the BAJA in 1980, the bankruptcy courts, by way of 
the pass-through jurisdiction of section 241 of the BRA, were also 
vested with jurisdiction under the BAJA. 86 
Although this analysis of the enactment of the EAJA seems to 
indicate that Congress granted the bankruptcy courts BAJA au-
thority simultaneously with the district courts, the language of 
House Report 1418, which limits the courts eligible to shift BAJA 
fees to those listed as courts of the United States in 28 U.S.C. 
§ 451,87 seems to indicate a contrary intent to exclude the bank-
ruptcy courts. A narrow focus on House Report 1418 may be mis-
leading, however, as two other committee reports and a conference 
report submitted to the full Congress on the BAJA do not include 
any reference to section 451. 88 In its report, the House Committee 
on Small Business stated, "The subsection (2412(d)(l)] applies to 
all civil actions except tort actions and those already covered by 
existing fee-shifting statutes."89 Nearly identical language appears 
in the Senate report from the Committee on the Judiciary.9o Most 
significantly, the Conference Report91 on the BAJA states that "the 
[BAJA] specifically allows for the payment of attorney fees, (in ad-
dition to costs as previously listed) to the prevailing party in any 
applying § 241 to the existing bankruptcy courts during the transition period, thereby gave 
them the power to exercise jurisdiction conferred on the district courts in title 11 cases. 
85. See Gower v. Farmers Home Admin. (In re Davis), 899 F.2d 1136, 1141 {11th Cir. 
1990). 
86. Before the BRA was repealed, only two cases in the bankruptcy courts discussed the 
EAJA. Hagan v. Heckler (In re Hagan), 44 B.R. 59 (Bankr. D.R.!. 1984); In re Parks, 84-2 
U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 'll 9744 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1984). In Hagan, the court awarded EAJA 
fees to the prevailing party without discussing jurisdiction. In Parks, the court refused to 
make an award because the petitioner was not a prevailing party. Interestingly, the govern-
ment party did not contest the bankruptcy court's jurisdiction in either case, nor did either 
bankruptcy court raise the jurisdiction issue sua sponte. 
87. 28 U.S.C. § 451 (1988); see H.R. REP. No. 1418, supra note 2, at 17, reprinted in 1980 
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4996; see supra notes 44-45, 77, and accompanying text. 
88. H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 1434, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 25 {1980), reprinted in 1980 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5003, 5014; H.R. REP. No. 1005, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1 {1980); S. REP. No. 
253, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. {1979). 
89. H.R. REP. No. 1005, supra note 88, at 18 (emphasis added). 
90. S. REP. No. 253, supra note 88, at 20. 
91. Courts often place particular emphasis on Conference Committee reports when inter-
preting the meaning of st~tutes. See, e.g., Zajac v. Federal Land Bank of St. Paul, 909 F.2d 
1181, 1182 (8th Cir. 1990) {"The conference committee's report ... represents the final state-
ment of terms agreed to by both houses. Next to the statute itself it is the most persuasive 
evidence of congressional intent." (internal quotation marks omitted)); Cohn v. United 
States, 872 F.2d 533, 534 {2d Cir. 1989) ("Since the conference report sets forth the final 
agreement of both houses, it is entitled to great weight in determining congressional in-
tent."), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 848 {1989); see also Patricia M. Wald, Some Observations on the 
Use of Legislative History in the 1981 Supreme Court Term, 68 low AL. REv. 195, 201 (1983) 
("Conference committee reports ... are considered particularly weighty."). 
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civil action with the United States."92 The Conference Report also 
states that the "bill requires a Federal Court to award to a prevail-
ing party other than the United States in a civil action involving the 
United States fees ... and other expenses."93 Significantly, Con-
gress did not modify "civil action" and used "federal court" rather 
than "court of the United States." Because bankruptcy courts are 
federal courts94 and bankruptcy actions are civil actions,9s the lan-
guage of these three reports includes the bankruptcy courts among 
those able to adjudicate BAJA petitions. 
The language of these reports conflicts with House Report 
1418's apparent limitation of "any court" to those courts enumer-
ated in section 451.96 One obvious resolution of this conflict is that 
the single statement in House Report 1418 simply does not repre-
sent the true intent of Congress regarding BAJA jurisdiction.97 Yet 
even if House Report 1418 accurately reflects Congress's intent, 
and only courts listed in 28 U.S.C. § 451 were granted BAJA juris-
diction, Congress still likely intended to include the bankruptcy 
courts. The reference to "court of the United States" in House Re-
port 1418 was made at a time when section 451 was scheduled to be 
amended to include the bankruptcy courts.98 Prior to the enact-
ment of the BRA, section 451, in pertinent part, provided: 
The term "court of the United States" includes the Supreme Court of 
the United States, courts of appeals, district courts constituted by 
chapter 5 of this title, including the Court of Claims, the Court of 
Customs and Patent Appeals, the Customs Court and any court ere-
92. H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 1434, supra note 88~ at 25, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 
5014 (emphasis added). 
93. Id. (emphasis added). 
94. Because bankruptcy courts are created by Congress and governed by title 28 of the 
U.S. Code, see 28 U.S.C. §§ 151-158 (1988), they are federal courts. 
95. The narrower of two Supreme Court constructions of "civil action" in the EAJA is "a 
proceeding in a court." Sullivan v. Hudson, 490 U.S. 877, 894 (1989) (White, J., dissenting). 
The majority in Hudson would include proceedings before an administrative law judge on 
remand from a district court as a "civil proceeding." Hudson, 490 U.S. at 892. See also 28 
U.S.C. § 1334(b) (1988) ("[T]he district courts shall have original but not exclusive jurisdic-
tion of all civil proceedings arising under title 11." (emphasis added)). 
96. See supra notes 44-45, 77 and accompanying text. 
97. In fact, additional evidence indicates that Congress did not intend to limit EAJA 
jurisdiction to the "courts of the United States." The House Judiciary Committee amended 
the long title of the Bill to read "An Act to provide for the payment by the United States of 
certain fees and cost incurred by prevailing parties in Federal agency adjudications and in 
civil action in courts of the United States." H.R. REP. No. 1418, supra note 2, at 18, reprinted 
in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4999 (emphasis added). The Conference Committee, however, 
adopted the Senate bill, rather than the version the House Judiciary Committee reported on 
in House Report 1418. H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 1434, supra note 88, at 20-21, reprinted in 1980 
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5009-10. The Senate bill was entitled "Equal Access to Justice Act." Id. 
98. When Congress referred to § 451 in the EAJA's legislative history in 1980, the BRA 
amendment adding the bankruptcy court to § 451 was already on the books, although it had 
not yet become effective. See 28 U.S.C. § 451 (Supp. IV 1980) (including the amended ver-
sion of § 451). 
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ated by Act of Congress the judges of which are entitled to hold office 
during good behavior.99 
The BRA amended section 451 to add the " 'bankruptcy courts, the 
judges of which are entitled to hold office for a term of 14 
years.' "100 The amendment to section 451 was scheduled to go into 
effect on April 1, 1984.101 Thus, even if House Report 1418 prop-
erly describes Congress's intent with respect to the scope of EAJA 
authority,102 the bankruptcy courts, in their own right, would auto-
matically assume EAJA authority in less than three years once the 
BRA had been fully implemented.103 In the meantime, bankruptcy 
courts would exercise all the power of the district court by virtue of 
the pass-through jurisdiction that was applicable during the transi-
tion period.104 Because the bankruptcy courts, in practice, could 
exercise EAJA authority without an explicit grant of jurisdiction 
during the transition period, a specific congressional grant of au-
thority was simply unnecessary. 
2. Effect of Subsequent Events on the EAJA 
Whatever the apparent intent of the Congress that originally 
passed the EAJA, three subsequent events arguably shed light on 
current congressional intent with respect to the jurisdiction of bank-
ruptcy courts under the EAJA. First, in 1984, Congress repealed 
section 241 of the BRA, eliminating both the jurisdictional pass-
through from the district courts to the bankruptcy courts and the 
addition of the bankruptcy courts to the definition of the "courts of 
the United States" in section 451 of title 28.10s The repeal of sec-
tion 241 thereby eliminated the explicit statutory source of bank-
ruptcy court authority over the BAJA. Second, in 1985, Congress 
amended the EAJA's definition of "court" to include the U.S. 
Claims Court.106 Third, in 1992, Congress again amended the 
EAJA's definition of "court," this time to include the U.S. Court of 
Veterans Appeals.107 Congress did not take advantage of either op-
portunity to address the scope of the EAJA with respect to the 
bankruptcy court. Section II.B.2.a argues that the repeal of the 
BRA did not deprive the bankruptcy courts of BAJA authority. 
99. 28 U.S.C. § 451 (1976) (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 451 (1988)). 
100. See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 213, 92 Stat. 2549, 2661. 
101. See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 402(b )-( d), 92 Stat. 2549, 
2682. 
102. It is not clear that House Report 1418 represents the best indication of Congress's 
intent. See supra notes 87-97 and accompanying text. 
103. See supra notes 99-101 and accompanying text. 
104. See supra notes 78-86 and accompanying text. 
105. See infra section 11.B.2.a. 
106. See infra section 11.B.2.b. 
107. See infra section 11.B.2.c. 
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Sections II.B.2.b and II.B.2.c argue that the 1985 and 1992 amend-
ments to the EAJA definition of "court" do not preclude the inclu-
sion of the bankruptcy court. 
a. The repeal of the BRA. Congress repealed the BRA in re-
sponse to the Supreme Court's plurality opinion in Northern Pipe-
line Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipeline Co.108 The Marathon 
Court held unconstitutional the bankruptcy courts' jurisdictional 
authority under BRA section 241. Because the Court also held that 
the unconstitutional portion of the jurisdictional grant was insever-
able from the remainder of section 241, it struck down the entire 
section.109 Congress responded with the Bankruptcy Amendments 
and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984 {BAFJA).110 This section dem-
onstrates that neither the Court's decision in Marathon nor the 
terms of the BAFJA undermine bankruptcy court authority under 
the EAJA. 
The Supreme Court invalidated the BRA in Marathon on the 
ground that bankruptcy courts cannot adjudicate questions of pri-
vate rights.111 The Marathon plurality noted, however, that matters 
involving public rights could be adjudicated by federal tribunals 
that lacked Article III protections.112 The government creates a 
public right when it waives its sovereign immunity and consents to 
be sued,113 as it did in passing the EAJA. EAJA applications are 
complaints against the government in an area where Congress has 
full authority to waive sovereign immunity. EAJA applications 
108. 458 U.S. 50 (1982). For discussion of the congressional repeal of the BRA, see Bee-
line Engg. & Constr., Inc. v. D'Espies, P.A. (In re Beeline Engg. & Constr., Inc.), 154 B.R. 
790, 791 (S.D. Fla. 1993); Nieves v. Melendez (In re Melendez), 153 B.R. 386, 389 (Bankr. D. 
Conn. 1993}; Walter J. Taggart, The New Bankruptcy Court System, 59 AM. BANKR. L.J. 231, 
232-37 (1985). 
109. Marathon, 458 U.S. at 87 n.40. 
110. Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333 (1984) (codified at scattered sections of 11 U.S.C. 
and 28 U.S.C.). 
111. 458 U.S. at 83-84. In Marathon, the debtor, the Northern Pipeline Construction Co. 
sued the Marathon Pipeline Co. in the bankruptcy court to recover damages for breach of 
contract and warranty. The Court found no applicable exception to the general rule that the 
judicial power of the United States must be exercised by an Article III tribunal. Marathon, 
458 U.S. at 70-71. The Supreme Court later stated its holding in Marathon as follows: 
The Court's holding ... establishes only that Congress may not vest in a non-Article III 
court the power to adjudicate, render final judgment, and issue binding orders in a tradi-
tional contract action arising under state law, without consent of the litigants, and sub-
ject only to appellate review. 
Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 584 (1985). 
112. One of the exceptions to the general rule that the judicial power of the United States 
must be exercised by an Article III tribunal is that Congress may assign questions of public 
rights to non-Article III bodies. Marathon, 458 U.S. at 67-70; Ex parte Bakelite Corp., 279 
U.S. 438, 452 (1929). 
113. 458 U.S. at 67-69. 
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therefore qualify as public rights which may be adjudicated by non-
Article III bodies, including the bankruptcy courts.114 
In Marathon, the Court also ruled that the unconstitutional as-
pects of BRA section 241 were not severable from the remainder of 
the Act.115 This effectively invalidated the entire BRA. Thus, due 
to Marathon's invalidation of section 241 in its entirety, including 
the "pass through" jurisdiction from the district courts to the bank-
ruptcy courts, the bankruptcy courts no longer exercised power 
identical to the district courts in title 11 cases.116 The Supreme 
Court left the onus on Congress to reconstitute the bankruptcy 
courts.117 
Congress passed the BAFJA to remedy the constitutional defi-
ciencies of the BRA identified by the Court in Marathon.118 Under 
the BAFJA, the bankruptcy court would have jurisdiction over title 
11 cases but would not be a "court of the United States."119 The 
BAFJA took effect June 27, 1984.120 
Although the Eleventh Circuit held, in effect, that the BAFJA's 
elimination of "court of the United States" status for the bank-
ruptcy courts removed BAJA jurisdiction from the bankruptcy 
courts,121 it is likely that Congress was completely unaware that the 
BAFJA amendments affected the EAJA. Even if congressional re-
searchers examined every statutory cross-reference to section 451 
114. See Anthony M. Sabino, "And Unequal Justice for All"- Bankruptcy Court Jurisdic-
tion Under the Equal Access to Justice Act, 22 MEM. ST. U. L. REV. 453, 483 (1992). 
115. The Court stated: 
As part of a comprehensive restructuring of the bankruptcy laws, Congress has vested 
jurisdiction over this and all matters related to cases under Title 11 in a single non-Art. 
III court, and has done so pursuant to a single statutory grant of jurisdiction. In these 
circumstances we cannot conclude that if Congress were aware that the grant of jurisdic-
tion could not constitutionally encompass this and similar claims, it would simply remove 
the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court over these matters, leaving the jurisdictional 
provision and the adjudicatory structure intact with respect to other types of claims, and 
thus subject to Art. III constitutional challenge on a claim-by-claim basis. 
Marathon, 458 U.S. at 87 n.40. Justices Rehnquist and O'Connor concurred in this analysis to 
create a six-justice majority for this position. 458 U.S. at 91-92. 
116. Recall that §§ 241 and 405 had granted the bankruptcy.courts all the jurisdiction 
held by the district courts in cases under title 11. See supra notes 78-86 and accompanying 
text. 
117. 458 U.S. at 88. The Court stayed its ruling until October 4, 1982, to allow Congress 
to create a new bankruptcy system. Marathon, 458 U.S. at 88. The Court later extended the 
stay to December 24, 1982. 459 U.S. 813 (1982). 
118. Vern Countryman, Scrambling to Define Bankruptcy Jurisdiction: The Chief Justice, 
the Judicial Conference, and the Legislative Process, 22 HARV. J. LEGJS. 1, 1 (1985). 
119. The BAFJA contained a section which provided, "Section 402(b) of the [BRA] is 
amended by striking out 'shall take effect June 28, 1984' and inserting in lieu thereof 'shall 
not be effective.'" Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 
98-353, § 113, 98 Stat. 333, 343. The BRA amendment to § 451 was thereby canceled. 
120. Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, 
§ 122(c), 98 Stat. 333, 346. 
121. Gower v. Farmers Home Admin. (In re Davis), 899 F.2d 1136 (11th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 498 U.S. 981 (1990). 
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of title 28 - which the BRA had amended to include the bank-
ruptcy courts - before amending that section in the BAFJA, they 
would not have been directed to the EAJA because the EAJA itself 
contains no cross-reference to section 451.122 Furthermore, the leg-
islative history of the BAFJA gives no indication that Congress was 
aware that the enactment of the BAFJA affected other statutes.123 
Absent clear evidence that Congress intended wide-reaching effects 
in other statutes when it replaced section 1471 of the BRA, one 
should not conclude that Congress intended for the BAFJA to take 
EAJA authority from the bankruptcy courts.124 
It is important to recognize that the issue is not whether the 
bankruptcy courts are appropriately considered "courts of the 
United States" as defined in section 451. The real question is 
whether the bankruptcy courts can exercise BAJA authority.1zs 
The questions are distinct. The group of courts included in section 
122. See 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (1988). Recall that the Eleventh Circuit linked the EAJA to 
section 451 through the EAJA's reference to costs enumerated in section 1920. See supra 
notes 33-43 and accompanying text. 
123. See STATEMENTS OF LEGISLATIVE LEADERS, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 576-
606; H. CoNF. REP. No. 882, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984) (setting out text of BAFJA without 
analysis). 
124. The notion that a change in prior law should not be presumed absent an express 
intent to make a change is a familiar one. See, e.g., United States v. Jordan, 915 F.2d 622, 627 
(11th Cir.) ("It is a cardinal rule of statutory construction that implying the repeal, either in 
whole or by a narrowing in scope, of one statute by the passage of a subsequent statute is 
disfavored and should be condoned only when Congress' intent to repeal is manifest." (cita· 
tions omitted)), cerl denied, 499 U.S. 979 (1990). In the bankruptcy context, courts often 
interpret the 1978 bankruptcy code to preserve the law of the prior system except in areas in 
which Congress expressly indicated that a change was intended. See, e.g., Dewsnup v. Timm, 
112 S. Ct. 773, 779 (1992); United Sav. Assn. v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assoc., 484 U.S. 
365, 380 (1988). Because there is considerable ambiguity regarding the current law, as 
demonstrated by the split between the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits, and because there is no 
direct evidence that Congress intended a change in the scope of the EAJA when it passed 
BAFJA, the pre-BAFJA regime of bankruptcy court authority over EAJA questions should 
continue. 
125. Some commentators, however, consider the § 451 question crucial. See, e.g., Sabino, 
supra note 114, at 483-84. But the courts that consider the current language of § 451 deter-
minative for the purposes of the EAJA and its sister statute, 26 U.S.C. § 7430 (1988), make 
the mistake of failing to consider § 451 in its historical context. Ninth Circuit caselaw demon-
strates the confusion that may be wrought by this error. In Perroton v. Gray (In re Per-
roton), 958 F.2d 889 (9th Cir. 1992), the Ninth Circuit held that a bankruptcy court was not a 
"court of the United States" as defined within § 451 of title 28 for the purpose of ruling on an 
in forma pauperis petition. Perroton, 958 F.2d at 896. Later, in IRS v. Germaine (In re 
Germaine), 152 B.R. 619 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1993), a Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel 
held that the bankruptcy courts were "court[s] of the United States" for the purpose of ruling 
on a 26 U.S.C. § 7430 petition to shift fees. Germaine, 152 B.R. at 626-27. The Germaine 
panel distinguished Perroton on the grounds that the definition of the phrase "court of the 
United States" included in title 28 did not apply to § 7430 of title 26. Because § 7430 was 
based on the EAJA, see supra note 47, which is included in title 28, this reasoning appears 
suspect. To complicate matters further, a federal district court in the Ninth Circuit has ruled 
that bankruptcy courts may not shift fees under § 7430. United States v. Yochum (In re 
Yochum), 156 B.R. 816 (D. Nev. 1993). The Yochum court stated it was not bound by the 
Bankruptcy Appellate Panel decision in Germaine and believed the decision in Perroton 
compelled its result. Yochum, 156 B.R. at 818 & n.2. 
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451 is a subset of those courts eligible to shift fees under the BAJA, 
as demonstrated by the inclusion of the United States Court of 
Claims and the United States Court of Veterans Appeals,126 even 
though those courts are not listed in section 451.127 If Congress's 
intent in passing the BAJA was to grant authority to the bankruptcy 
courts only because they were expected to be "courts of the United 
States" and enjoyed the equivalent of district court jurisdiction 
under the BRA and were therefore qualified to exercise BAJA 
power, then it is true that the Marathon decision and the enactment 
of BAFJA would have stripped the bankruptcy courts of BAJA 
power. If, however, Congress intended to grant BAJA authority to 
the bankruptcy courts regardless of their status as "courts of the 
United States," then the limitation in House Report 1418 is merely 
descriptive rather than defining, as section 451 was meant to in-
clude the bankruptcy courts. In that case, the developments cata-
lyzed by Marathon should not alter the original intent of Congress, 
which was to give the bankruptcy courts BAJA power.12s 
The BAJA itself provides convincing evidence that Congress did 
not believe that only the "courts of the United States" as defined in 
section 451 were qualified to enforce the BAJA. Beyond granting 
fee-shifting power "in any civil action" to "any court having juris-
diction of that action,"129 the statute also grants fee-shifting author-
ity to "[a]n agency that conducts an adversary adjudication."130 An 
agency that conducts an adversary adjudication is not a "court of 
the United States."131 Congress's willingness to allow BAJA fee 
shifting by administrative agencies strongly suggests that fee-shift-
ing authority should not depend upon status as a "court of the 
United States." 
The inclusion of agency adjudicative bodies among those em-
powered to shift fees also demonstrates that, for BAJA purposes, 
there is no substantive significance in section 451's list of courts. 
One need not be appointed by the President and confirmed by 
Congress for a life term to be judicially qualified to enforce the 
126. See 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(F) (Supp. IV 1992). 
127. See 28 U.S.C. § 451 (1988). 
128. See supra section Il.B.1. Absent the ruling in Marathon, the bankruptcy courts 
would have exercised EAJA power both during the transition period as a result of the pass-
through jurisdiction from the district courts included in § 241 of the BRA, see supra notes 78-
86 and accompanying text, and after the full enactment of the BRA in 1984, due to the 
jurisdiction granted in § 241 as well as the proposed amendment to 28 U.S.C. § 451. See 
supra notes 100-01 and accompanying text. 
129. Equal Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 96-481, tit. II, § 204, 94 Stat. 2321, 2328 
(1980) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(l)(a) (1988)). 
130. Equal Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 96-481, tit. II, § 203, 94 Stat. 2321, 2325 
(1980) (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 504 (1988)). 
131. See 28 U.S.C. § 451 (1988) (providing separate definitions of agency and court of the 
United States). 
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EAJA. By allowing non-Article III administrative agencies to adju-
dicate EAJA claims, Congress has effectively stated that BAJA is-
sues are matters of public rights, eligible to be decided by non-
Article III courts.132 
b. The 1985 amendments to the EAJA. In 1985, Congress 
amended the EAJA's definition of "court" to include the U.S. 
Claims Court.133 One commentator, relying on the doctrine of ex-
pressio unius est exclusio alterius - the expression of one thing is 
the exclusion of another134 - suggests that courts should interpret 
the inclusion of the Claims Court in the 1985 amendment to ex-
clude the bankruptcy courts.135 Courts should reject this argument 
for three reasons. First, the language of the 1985 amendment sim-
ply does not lend itself to interpretation under expressio unius. The 
1985 amendment to the BAJA definition of court provides that the 
EAJA definition of court includes the Claims Court.136 According 
to the Supreme Court, "the term 'including' is not one of all-em-
bracing definition, but connotes simply an illustrative application of 
the general principle."137 Therefore, expressio unius ought not ap-
ply to an illustrative list signaled by the operative verb includes. 
The 1985 amendment to include the Claims Court - a non-Article 
III court - in the EAJA definition of court represented an "illus-
trative application of the general principle"138 that BAJA's refer-
132. See Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipeline Co., 458 U.S. 50, 67-70 
(1982) (holding that Congress may create administrative bodies with authority to adjudicate 
"public rights" but not "private rights"). 
133. Act of Aug. 5, 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-80, § 2(c), 99 Stat. 183, 185 (codified at 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2412(d)(2)(f) (1988)). 
134. "Under [expressio unius], if a statute specifies one exception to a general rule or 
assumes to specify the effects of a certain provision, other exceptions or effects are ex-
cluded." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 581 (6th ed. 1990). 
135. Sabino, supra note 114, at 485-86. Professor Sabino, after concluding that "[t]here 
appears to be enough elasticity in the statutory scheme to include the bankruptcy courts in 
the definition of 'courts of the United States,' " id. at 485, states that the only logical conclu-
sion to be drawn from Congress's failure to amend the EAJA to include the bankruptcy 
courts "is that Congress did not intend to imbue the bankruptcy court with jurisdiction under 
the EAJA." Id. at 485-86. Section II.A of this Note showed that the original intent of Con-
gress was to include the bankruptcy courts, a point with which Sabino seemingly agrees. See 
id. at 463 n.61 (citing Reuben B. Robertson & Mary C. Fowler, Recovering Attorneys' Fees 
from the Government Under the Equal Access to Justice Act, 56 TuL. L. REV. 903, 904 n.7 
(1982) (noting that the pre-BAFJA version of § 451 was to include the bankruptcy courts)). 
Relying on the 1985 amendment to the EAJA, Sabino then argues, however, that the subse-
quent intent and actions of Congress stripped EAJA authority from the bankruptcy courts. 
Sabino, supra note 114, at 485-86; see also Gower v. Farmers Home Admin. (In re Davis), 899 
F.2d 1136, 1139 n.7 (11th Cir.) ("Congress's failure to make any similar clarifying amendment 
with regard to the Tax Court or the bankruptcy courts supports the continuing vitality of 
Bowen."), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 981 (1990). 
136. After the 1985 amendment, the EAJA provided, " 'court' includes the United States 
Claims Court." 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(F) (1988). 
137. Federal Land Bank v. Bismarck Lumber Co., 314 U.S. 95, 100 (1941); cf. 11 U.S.C. 
§ 102(3) (1988). 
138. See supra text accompanying note 137. 
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ence to "any court" plainly includes non-Article III courts. Thus a 
court need not be listed in section 451 as a "court of the United 
States'' to exercise EAJA authority properly.139 
Second, the expressio unius doctrine should not apply given the 
EAJA's legislative background. The doctrine assumes that all alter-
natives not elected were considered and rejected,14o an assumption 
that cannot be supported in this case. Although some commenta-
tors criticize the use of the doctrine on this ground generally,141 its 
use is especially questionable in this instance, because the legisla-
tive history indicates that the 1985 amendment was a particularized 
response to confusion concerning the scope of EAJA jurisdiction in 
the Claims Court,142 not a comprehensive review of EAJA jurisdic-
tion. No general principle applicable to the bankruptcy courts 
should be drawn from such specific action.143 
Third, and perhaps most importantly, the legislative history to 
the 1985 amendment states that the amendment is merely a clarifi-
cation, rather than a change, in the existing law.144 The legislative 
history indicates that Congress used the 1985 amendment to re-
spond to misinterpretations of the EAJA, 145 suggesting that the 
1985 amendment was a legislative interpretation of the EAJA 
rather than an act of lawmaking that might support an expressio 
139. See also supra notes 126-32 and accompanying text. 
140. Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation - in the Classroom and in the Court-
room, 50 U. CHI. L. REv. 800, 813 (1983) (expressio unius "would make sense only if all 
omissions in legislative drafting were deliberate"). 
141. See, e.g., Max Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 43 HARV. L. REv. 863, 874 (1930) 
("The first comment on [expressio unius] is that it is not true .... [Expressio unius] illustrates 
one of the most fatuously simple of logical fallacies .... "); Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Ad-
ministration after Chevron, 90 CoLUM. L. REv. 2071, 2109 n.182 (1990) ("[The expressio 
unius] canon is a questionable one in light of the dubious reliability of inferring specific intent 
from silence."). 
142. H.R. REP. No. 120, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 17-18 (1985), reprinted in 1985 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 132, 146 (citing Bailey v. United States, 721F.2d357 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (noting 
the government's withdrawal of its objection on appeal to the Claims Court's authority to 
hear the EAJA dispute in light of the decision in Ellis v. United States, 711F.2d1571 (Fed. 
Cir. 1983))); see also Ellis, 711 F.2d at 1573-75 (holding that the non-Article III Claims Court 
inherits EAJA authority from its Article III predecessor, the Court of Claims). 
143. One commentator has noted that legislatures often respond discretely to particular 
problems: 
A legislature typically acts only when and as someone presses it to act. Hence it is likely 
to deal at one point of time with less than the whole, potential extent of the issues or 
choices it confronts. Thus, legislative intent may emerge in full definition only through a 
succession of acts. 
HURST, supra note 75, at 61. 
144. H.R. REP. No. 120, supra note 142, at 17-18, reprinted in 1985 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 146; 
see also Charles E. Grassley, Congress Wants a Wide Reaching EAJA, ABA J., Mar. 1985, at 
40, 44 ("[T]he [1985 amendments to] the EAJA do not expand the act; they clarify the intent 
of Congress in enacting the legislation in 1980."). 
145. See H.R. REP. No. 120, supra note 142, at 9, reprinted in 1985 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 137 
("Part of the problem in implementing the Act has been that agencies and courts are miscon-
struing the Act."). 
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unius analysis. Moreover, in 1985, no confusion or conflicting 
caselaw existed concerning the applicability of the BAJA to the 
bankruptcy courts.146 Because Congress merely sought to clarify 
existing law and no dispute had arisen concerning the bankruptcy 
courts' jurisdiction, there was no reason for Congress to address the 
issue in the 1985 amendment. 
c. The 1992 amendment to the EAJA. As with the 1985 amend-
ment to the BAJA, the 1992 amendment to the definition of court 
does not support the exclusion of the bankruptcy courts from 
BAJA jurisdiction. The 1992 amendment includes the U.S. Court 
of Veterans Appeals in the EAJA definition of court.141 Although 
the 1992 amendment appears to provide additional support for the 
expressio unius argument, the amendment provides no more evi-
dence of a congressional intent to exclude the bankruptcy courts 
from BAJA authority than does the similar 1985 amendment. In 
the legislative history of the 1992 amendment, Congress again em-
phasized that the amendment was a response to a particular court 
opinion,148 and that the amendment was merely a clarification of 
existing law.149 
The 1992 BAJA amendment was a response to Jones v. Derwin-
ski, 150 in which the U.S. Court of Veterans Appeals held that it 
lacked authority to award EAJA fees because Congress did not in-
tend for the cpurt to have BAJA authority.151 As with the bank-
ruptcy courts, however, the plain meaning of "any court" in the 
BAJA's jurisdictional provision indicates that the statute should 
have covered the Court of Veterans Appeals.152 The legislative his-
tory of the 1992 amendment underscores this point by emphasizing 
that the amendment was merely a clarification of existing law, not a 
146. Prior to 1986, only five opinions discuss the EAJA in the context of the bankruptcy 
courts. Not one of those cases suggests that the bankruptcy courts are ineligible to exercise 
EAJA authority. See United States Small Business Admin. v. Esmond (In re Esmond), 752 
F.2d 1106 (5th Cir. 1985) (remanding to bankruptcy court for a determination of propriety of 
EAJA award); Hagan v. Heckler (In re Hagan), 44 B.R. 59 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1984) (exercising 
EAJA power); In re Parks, 84-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 'lI 9744 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1984) 
(reaching the merits of EAJA dispute); In re Newlin, 29 B.R. 781 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (affirming 
EAJA award by bankruptcy court); see also In re Conti, 50 B.R. 142, 147 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 
1985) (stating, in dicta and although no EAJA petition was before the court, that it would be 
appropriate for the bankruptcy court to award EAJA fees). 
147. Federal Courts Administration Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-572, § 506(a), 106 Stat. 
4506, 4513. 
148. See Jones v. Derwinski, 2 Vet. App. 231 (Ct. Vet. App. 1992) (holding the Court of 
Veterans Appeals unable to shift fees under the EAJA), vacated sub nom. Jones v. Principi, 
985 F.2d 582 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (vacating judgment in light of the 1992 EAJA amendment). 
149. H.R. REP. No. 1006, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 25 (1992), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
3921, 3934 ("[The amendment] amends EAJA and clarifies that it applies to the Court of 
Veterans Appeals."). 
150. 2 Vet. App. 231 (Ct. Vet. App. 1992). 
151. Jones, 2 Vet. App. at 233-34. 
152. See supra section 11.B.1. 
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change in law.153 The House Judiciary Committee, by classifying 
the amendment as a clarification rather than a change in law, sug-
gests that the amendment is an example of the proper interpreta-
tion of the meaning of "court" within the EAJA.154 Thus once 
again, the expressio unius doctrine should not apply because no evi-
dence of a comprehensive review of the scope of the BAJA exists. 
To the contrary, Congress again opted for a narrow solution rather 
than considering other possible ambiguities in BAJA jurisdiction,155 
even though the circuit split regarding bankruptcy jurisdiction had 
developed.156 Endowing this process with the presumption of care-
ful consideration and exclusion of all other possible amendments 
makes little sense in light of the actual record. 
The better explanation of the 1985 and 1992 amendments is that 
they are examples of Congress' clarifying the existing law by cor-
recting court decisions that took the wrong path. As such, both the 
1985 and 1992 amendments may be categorized as legislative inter-
pretations of the BAJA that serve to emphasize the broad reach of 
the BAJA. 
C. Purposes of the EAJA 
Examining the purposes of the EAJA provides further support 
for the conclusion that the bankruptcy courts have fee-shifting au-
thority - a conclusion already reached through textual analysis 
and a review of the legislative history. This section examines four 
purposes of the BAJA - encouraging private litigants to assert 
their legal rights against the government despite the government's 
overwhelming resource advantage, providing for equality among lit-
igants, establishing a check on government power, and encouraging 
a testing ground for government positions157 - and concludes that 
153. H.R. REP. No. 1006, supra note 149, at 25 (1992), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 
3934. 
154. See id. 
155. See supra note 143. 
156. The speed with which Congress passed the amendment and the fact that the legisla-
tive history consists of only one paragraph relevant to the EAJA suggests that Congress did 
not comprehensively review the scope of the EAJA in conjunction with the 1992 amendment. 
Only slightly more than seven months passed between the decision in Jones v. Derwinski, 2 
Vet. App. 231, 231 (Ct. Vet. App. 1992), decided March 13, and the enactment of the amend-
ment on October 29, 1992. Federal Courts Administration Act of 1992, Pub L. No. 102-572, 
106 Stat. 4506. The relevant legislative history is included in H.R. REP. No. 1006, supra note 
149, at 25, reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3934. 
157. According to the EAJA, 
"position of the United States" means, in addition to the position taken by the United 
States in the civil action, the action or failure to act by the agency upon which the civil 
action is based; except that fees and expenses may not be awarded to a party for any 
portion of the litigation in which the party has unreasonably protracted the proceedings 
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granting BAJA authority to bankruptcy courts furthers each of 
these purposes. 
1. Reducing the Deterrent Effect of Government Resources on 
the Average Litigant 
Bankruptcy court jurisdiction under the EAJA is consistent with 
the EAJA's purpose of providing a check on the coercive potential 
of the government's tremendous resources. In enacting the EAJA, 
Congress voiced specific concern that the government bureaucracy, 
with its greater resources and expertise, could practically coerce 
other litigants to comply with its regulatory or litigation position.158 
The BAJA provides, "It is the purpose of this title - (1) to dimin-
ish the deterrent effect of seeking review of, or defending against, 
governmental action .... "159 The Supreme Court has summarized 
the statute's deterrent rationale as follows: 
"For many citizens, the costs of securing vindication of their rights 
and the inability to recover attorneys fees preclude resort to the adju-
dicatory process. . . . When the cost of contesting a Government or-
der, for example, exceeds the amount at stake, a party has no realistic 
choice and no effective remedy. In these cases, it is more practical to 
endure an injustice than to contest it." The EAJA was designed to 
rectify this situation.160 
Congress was particularly concerned that small businesspersons 
were being forced to submit to the government due to the costs of 
establishing their rights against a bigger, better financed, more ex-
perienced adversary.161 In congressional debate, Senator Goldwa-
ter said: "[T]his glaring inequity of current law is an 
encouragement to governmental arbitrariness. What hope does a 
small citizen or business have to challenge all the resources of the 
mighty Federal Government when even if he wins the administra-
tive or judicial decision, his legal fees virtually leave him in bank-
28 U.S.C. § 2412{d)(2){D) {1988). Essentially, this means that both the litigation position as 
well as prelitigation conduct comprise the "position of the United States." See Cummings v. 
Sullivan, 950 F.2d 492, 496 (7th Cir. 1991). 
158. See H.R. REP. No. 1418, supra note 2, at 10, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4988 
("Thus, at the present time, the Government with its greater resources and expertise can in 
effect coerce compliance with its position."). 
159. Equal Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 96-481, tit. II, § 202{c), 94 Stat. 2321, 2325 
{1980). 
160. Sullivan v. Hudson, 490 U.S. 877, 883 (1989) (quoting S. REP. No. 253, supra note 88, 
at 5). 
161. Four members of Congress spoke in favor of the EAJA because small businesses 
were being forced toward bankruptcy while attempting to establish their rights against the 
government. 126 CoNG. REc. 28,643 (1980) (statements of Rep. Smith, Rep. Railsback, and 
Rep. McDade); 126 CoNG. REc. 28,653 (1980) (statement of Rep. Symms). The concern for 
small businesses is also evident throughout the report of the House Committee on Small 
Business. H.R. REP. No. 1005, supra note 88, at 5-8, 11. 
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ruptcy?"162 Senator Baldus echoed this sentiment, stating, "[I]t is a 
terrifying prospect now of fighting a court case, winning, and yet, 
going bankrupt."163 In short, Congress recognized the vulnerability 
of the small business and provided a remedy for situations in which 
the taxpayer would be economically defeated even when legally vic-
torious. It is illogical to assume that Congress intended to protect 
citizens from being driven to the brink of bankruptcy, only to aban-
don them at the threshold of title 11.164 
The filing of a bankruptcy petition does not obviate the need for 
BAJA protection. If the bankruptcy is in the reorganization stage, 
the debtor in possession has all the same motivations and influences 
as a prebankruptcy owner involved in a district court case,165 except 
that the debtor has fewer resources with which to work. The likeli-
hood of acquiescence to an unreasonable government position is 
even greater in bankruptcy than in administrative hearings or other 
civil actions in federal court because the nongovernment party typi-
cally has fewer resources than litigants in other civil actions to with-
stand the economic pressure inherent in litigating against the 
government.166 The economic condition of the debtor only magni-
fies the government's coercive power. The presence, in the bank-
ruptcy courts, of the precise danger that Congress expressly sought 
162. 125 CoNG. REc. 21,438 {1979) (statement of Sen. Goldwater). 
163. 126 CoNG. REc. 28,654 {1980) (statement of Rep. Baldus). 
164. Cf. SuUivan v. Hudson, 490 U.S. 877 {1988). In Sullivan, the Court awarded EAJA 
fees to a Social Security claimant for expenses incurred in an administrative proceeding in 
which the United States was not represented by an attorney, 490 U.S. at 892-93, notwith-
standing the fact that the EAJA only allows for an award of fees in administrative hearings 
when the position of the United States is represented by counsel or otherwise. 5 U.S.C. 
§ 504{b ){l){C) {1988). In support of its holding, the Court reasoned that "we find it difficult 
to ascribe to Congress an intent to throw the Social Security claimant a lifeline that it knew 
was a foot short." 490 U.S. at 890. It is equally difficult to ascribe such a congressional intent 
regarding a bankrupt claimant, especially in light of the concern for small business repeatedly 
expressed in the congressional debate. See supra notes 161-63 and accompanying text. 
165. The debtors in possession "bring to the bankruptcy court their old allegiances and 
antagonisms, as well as their business judgment and experience." JAMES J. WHITE & RAY-
MOND T. NIMMER, BANKRUPTCY 64 {2d ed. 1992). This is not to say that the actual prefiling 
disputes the debtor in possession may have had with the government Will be adjudicated by 
the bankruptcy court. Those disputes will likely be postponed by the automatic stay. See 11 
U.S.C. § 362 {1988). The debtor in possession faced with a bankruptcy dispute against the 
federal government is, however, subject to the same pressures that Congress believed were 
deterring citizens from asserting their legal rights. See H.R. REP. No. 1418, supra note 2, at 5, 
reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4984. 
166. Although the debtor enjoys some procedural advantages, such as the automatic stay, 
see 11 U.S.C. § 362 {1988), that are designed to reduce the economic pressure inherent in 
bankruptcy, the automatic stay does nothing to reduce the pressure inherent in a violation of 
the stay, an action to lift the stay, or an objection to the debtor's use of cash collateral by the 
government. See 11 U.S.C. § 363 {1988). Application of the EAJA would encourage a 
debtor to litigate these issues, confident that if the government acted without substantial 
justification, the debtor will not suffer a loss solely by asserting its rights. 
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to prevent through the BAJA 167 emphasizes the need to interpret 
the BAJA correctly to resolve this situation. 
2. Placing Litigants on Equal Footing 
In enacting the BAJA, Congress sought to remove the federal 
government's sovereign immunity with respect to attorney's fees.168 
Before Congress passed the BAJA in 1980, courts could not shift 
fees against the United States without explicit statutory author-
ity.169 The government was therefore immune to many statutory 
fee-shifting laws and common law exceptions to the American rule 
to which its citizens were subject. Congress enacted the BAJA spe-
cifically to put the government on equal footing with other litigants 
already subject to fee-shifting rules.17° 
Absent BAJA authority the bankruptcy courts have the power 
to award fees and costs when appropriate, but not against the fed-
eral government.171 By enacting the BAJA, Congress changed this 
167. See O'Connor v. United States Dept. of Energy, 942 F.2d 771, 774 {10th Cir. 1991) 
(noting that a grant of EAJA authority to the bankruptcy court is congruous with the EAJA 
purpose of encouraging individuals to challenge government action). 
168. The EAJA provides: "It is the purpose of this title - ... (2) to insure the applica-
bility in actions by or against the United States of the common law and statutory exceptions 
to the 'American Rule' respecting the award of attorney fees." Equal Access to Justice Act, 
Pub. L. No. 96-481, tit. II, § 202(c), 94 Stat. 2321, 2325 {1980). 
169. The text of 28 U.S.C. § 2412 in 1976 was as follows: 
Except as otherwise specifically provided by statute, a judgment for costs, as enumerated 
in § 1920 of this title but not including the fees and expenses of attorneys may be 
awarded to the prevailing party in any civil action brought by or against the United 
States or any agency or official of the United States acting in his official capacity, in any 
court having jurisdiction of such action. 
28 U.S.C. § 2412 {1976). For an interpretation of that section, see Alyeska Pipeline Service 
Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240, 265-68 (1975) (holding that pre-EAJA § 2412 barred 
fee awards against the federal government unless the award was expressly authorized by 
statute). Some of the statutory exceptions to the American rule are listed in supra note 4. 
170. See 28 U.S.C. § 2412(b) (1988)). 
171. Without EAJA authority, bankruptcy courts would be prevented from shifting fees 
and costs against the federal government in situations in which they could shift fees and costs 
against a private litigant. These limitations arise in at least four contexts. First, bankruptcy 
rule 7054 allows courts to shift costs to prevailing parties unless prohibited by law. See FED. 
R. BANKR. P. 7054{b). The opposite presumption applies to the federal government, as costs 
may be shifted against the federal government only to the extent permitted by law. Id. One 
bankruptcy court has even held that costs available under rule 7054 include attorney's fees. 
See Jn re Roco Corp., 37 B.R. 770, 775 (Bankr. D. R.I. 1984). Bankruptcy rule 7054 mirrors 
federal rule of civil procedure 54. Civil procedure rule 54, like bankruptcy rule 7054, allows 
courts to shift costs, but not against the United States unless there is a specific statutory 
authorization. FED. R. C1v. P. 54{d). The EAJA and its 1966 predecessor, Act of July 18, 
1966, Pub. L. No. 89-507, 80 Stat. 308 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (1976)), provide the 
statutory basis for an award of costs, see 28 U.S.C. § 2412(a) (1988), and fees, see 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2412{b) (1988). Therefore, without EAJA power, the bankruptcy courts are unable to put 
the federal government on equal footing with other litigants. 
Second, bankruptcy courts can impose sanctions of costs and attorney's fees against a 
litigant or its attorney for a violation of bankruptcy rule 9011. See FED. R. BANKR. P. 9011. 
Bankruptcy rule 9011 incorporates civil procedure rule 11. See FED. R. C1v. P. 11; see, e.g., In 
re Rainbow Magazine, Inc., 136 B.R. 545 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1992). Bankruptcy rule 9011 ap-
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system in the federal courts,172 declaring that "there appears to be 
no justification for exempting the United States" from exceptions 
plies to "(e]very petition, pleading, motion and other paper served or filed in a [bankruptcy] 
case ••. on behalf of a party represented by an attorney, except a list, schedule, (or] state-
ment." FED. R. BANKR. P. 9011. Despite the pervasive effect of rule 9011 on nongovern-
ment litigants, bankruptcy courts may not sanction the federal government under rule 9011 
because the rule is not sufficiently explicit to waive sovereign immunity. See Graham v. 
United States (In re Graham), 981 F.2d 1135, 1140 (10th Cir. 1992). 
Third, the bankruptcy code provides that collection efforts regarding discharged debts are 
permanently enjoined. 11 U.S.C. § 524(a) (1988). Debtors may recover damages, including 
attorney's fees, if the injunction is violated. Kimco Leasing, Inc. v. Knee, 144 B.R. 1001, 1003 
(N.D. Ind. 1992); In re Rosteck, 85 B.R. 73 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1988). Section 106 of the bank-
ruptcy code, the general waiver of sovereign immunity, does not waive immunity with respect 
to damage suits resulting from a governmental violation of the permanent injunction. 11 
U.S.C. § 106 (1988); see also IRS v. Germaine (In re Germaine), 152 B.R. 619, 623 (Bankr. 
9th Cir. 1993) (holding that 26 U.S.C. § 7430 (1988), the EAJA's sister statute, did waive 
sovereign immunity). 
Finally, the bankruptcy courts cannot put the government on equal footing with respect to 
violations of the automatic stay. See 11 U.S.C. § 362 (1988). The Bankruptcy Code provides 
that an individual injured by a willful violation of the automatic stay may recover, among 
other things, costs and attorney's fees incurred because of the violation. See 11 U.S.C. 
§ 362(h) (1988). 
Courts are split regarding whether the general waiver of sovereign immunity in bank-
ruptcy code § 106 applies to § 362(h). Some courts hold that the general waiver is applicable, 
see United States v. Bulson (In re Bulson), 117 B.R. 537, 541 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1990); Price v. 
United States (In re Price), 130 B.R. 259, 267-68 (N.D. Ill. 1991), while others contend that 
sovereign immunity bars a monetary award under § 362(h). See United States v. Academy 
Answering Serv., Inc. (In re Academy Answering Serv., Inc.), 100 B.R. 327, 329-30 (N.D. 
Ohio 1989); Davis v. IRS, 136 B.R. 414, 415 (E.D. Va. 1992) (holding that Congress waived 
the government's sovereign immunity in § 106, but only to the extent of the government's 
claim against the estate; actual money damages are precluded). 
The Supreme Court has emphasized that § 106 is not a complete waiver of sovereign 
immunity. United States v. Nordic Village, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 1011 {1992); Hoffman v. Connecti-
cut Dept. of Income Maintenance, 492 U.S. 96 {1989). Waivers of sovereign immunity must 
be "unequivocally expressed," Nordic Village, 112 S. Ct. at 1014, and are to be strictly con-
strued. 112 S. Ct. at 1015. The Court has not clarified the specific question of whether a 
§ 362{h) claim for damages resulting from a violation of the automatic stay against the fed-
eral government is precluded by sovereign immunity. Differing interpretations of Nordic 
Village have led to opposite results. See Pinkstaff v. United States (In re Pinkstaff), 974 F.2d 
113, 115 (9th Cir. 1992) (sovereign immunity is waived by 11 U.S.C. § 106{a)); University 
Medical Ctr. v. Sullivan (In re University Medical Ctr.), 973 F.2d 1065, 1068 {3d Cir. 1992) 
(sovereign immunity is waived by 11U.S.C.§106{a)); Quillen v. United States, 160 B.R. 776, 
777 (W.D. Va. 1993) (sovereign immunity bars recovery of fees against the United States); 
Nichols v. IRS (In re Nichols), 143 B.R. 104, 105-07 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1992) (§ 106 only 
waives sovereign immunity if the government has filed a proof of claim against the estate); In 
re Stuber, 142 B.R. 435, 438-39 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1992) (sovereign immunity bars recovery of 
fees against the United States); Taborski v. United States, 141 B.R. 959, 964 {N.D. Ill. 1992) 
(sovereign immunity is waived by 11 U.S.C. § 106{a)); Toti v. United States (In re Toti), 141 
B.R. 126, 131-33 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1992) (sovereign immunity bars recovery offees against 
United States), revel on other grounds, 149 B.R. 829 (E.D. Mich. 1993). 
One court has resolved this problem by relying on the EAJA. See In re Schafer, 146 B.R. 
477 (D. Kan. 1992). The court held that EAJA § 2412(b) was a waiver of sovereign immunity 
that allowed a bankruptcy court to award attorney's fees to a prevailing debtor even though 
§ 106 provided no such waiver. Schafer, 146 B.R. at 481. The Schafer court cited O'Connor 
as binding Tenth Circuit precedent to support bankruptcy court jurisdiction over the EAJA, 
but did not acknowledge the circuit split. 146 B.R. at 481. 
172. H.R. REP. No. 1418, supra note 2, at 9, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4987 (not-
ing that the United States should be held to at least the same standards in litigation as private 
parties). 
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to the American rule.173 This reasoning applies as much to the 
bankruptcy courts as to other federal courts. 
The BAJA purpose of eliminating the federal government's sov-
ereign immunity with respect to litigation costs is also consistent 
with the waiver of sovereign immunity in the bankruptcy code.174 
When the government acts as a litigant rather than in its sovereign 
capacity, there is no need to extend sovereign immunity.11s Con-
gress's decision to hold government parties to the same standards as 
other litigants176 recognizes that government parties that act with-
out substantial justification, like the Farmers Home Administration 
in Davis,111 or the IRS,178 have no special right to immunity based 
on their status as governmental units. The reasons for removing the 
federal government's sovereign immunity with respect to attorney 
fees are therefore as compelling in the bankruptcy court as in other 
federal courts vested with EAJA jurisdiction. 
3. Deterrence of Unjustified Government Action 
Congress enacted the BAJA in part to deter unjustified govern-
ment action in bringing and litigating lawsuits.179 Including the 
173. Id. 
174. See 11 U.S.C. § 106 {1988). 
175. The Supreme Court has held the EAJA is subject to a narrow interpretation as a 
waiver of sovereign immunity. Ardestani v. INS, 112 S. Ct. 515, 520-21 (1991). Of course, 
the corollary to the general rule concerning waivers of immunity is that a court should not 
construe a waiver more narrowly than Congress intended it. Ardestani, 112 S. Ct. at 520. As 
demonstrated earlier, when the EAJA was passed, Congress intended for the bankruptcy 
courts to exercise EAJA jurisdiction. See supra section II.B.1. Therefore, the rule requiring 
a narrow construction of the EAJA does not exclude the bankruptcy courts from EAJA 
jurisdiction. 
Additionally, some have argued the doctrine of sovereign immunity is inapplicable to the 
EAJA. See Thomas W. Holm, Note, Aliens' Alienation from Justice: The Equal Access to 
Justice Act Should Apply to Deportation Proceedings, 75 MINN. L. REV. 1185, 1217-19 (1991); 
Arlene S. Ragozin, Comment, The Waiver of Immunity in the Equal Access to Justice Act: 
Clarifying Opaque Language, 61 WASH. L. REv. 217, 238-41 (1986). Because the purpose of 
the rule requiring a narrow construction of waivers of sovereign immunity is to protect public 
funds and allow for discretion in legitimate government action, and because the EAJA re-
flects the legislature's judgment regarding the proper balancing of both those factors, the 
EAJA should not be subject to the rule requiring narrow construction of waivers of sovereign 
immunity. See Ardestan~ 112 S. Ct. at 525-26 {Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
176. See supra notes 172-73 and accompanying text. 
177. The claim of the Farmers Home Administration in Davis was equitably subordinated 
because the agency's conduct toward other creditors was "at best, misleading." Gower v. 
Farmers Home Admin. (In re Davis), 899 F.2d 1136, 1137 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 
981 {1990). 
178. The IRS is a frequent violator of the bankruptcy code. See supra note 17. 
179. See H.R. REP. No. 1418, supra note 2, at 14, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4993; 
126 CoNG. REc. 28,845 {1980) (statement of Sen. Dominici) ("So I am quick to admit that, 
while it is a bill intended to recompense the average American and the small businessman for 
legal fees, it is also a bill which will begin to put some skids under arbitrary regulation and 
rulemaking."); see also June Carbone, The Misguided Application of Traditional Fee Doctrine 
to the Equal Access to Justice Act, 26 B.C. L. REv. 843, 874 (1985) ("In its methodology, the 
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bankruptcy courts within EAJA jurisdiction serves this purpose. At 
the time the EAJA was passed, Congress was concerned that gov-
ernment agencies sometimes abused their power.180 By putting 
these government entities at risk for their opponent's attorney's 
fees,181 Congress hoped to curb the unreasonable exercise of gov-
ernment authority. This continues to be an important goal in bank-
ruptcy, where excessive litigation often channels the estate's 
resources to the attorneys, rather than to creditors and the 
debtor.182 
4. Testing Government Action 
Prior to the enactment of the EAJA, Congress perceived that 
many government positions went unc;:hallenged due to the high cost 
of litigating against the government.183 As a result, the government 
repeatedly asserted these positions although they were never legiti-
mated through a hearing.184 Congress was not only concerned 
about untested government arguments; it also believed that, too 
Act pays greater attention to the deterrent effect on federal agencies than to the vindication 
of any single interest."). 
180. See H.R. REP. No. 1418, supra note 2, at 10, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4988 
("[T)here is evidence that small businesses are the target of agency action precisely because 
they do not have the resources to fully litigate the issue."); S. REP. No. 253, supra note 88, at 
5 n.1; 126 CoNG. REc. 28,649 (1980) (statement of Rep. Smith) ("The horror stories of Gov-
ernment actions brought without substantial justification are legion."); see also Commis-
sioner v. Jean, 496 U.S. 154, 165 (1990) (noting that Congress passed the EAJA partially due 
to a concern that government agencies were exercising their authority unreasonably). 
181. Mandatory awards under EAJA § 2412(d) of fees and expenses incurred by the pre-
vailing party are paid by the agency over which the private party prevailed. 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2412(d)(4) (1988). The assignment of responsibility for the fees under subsection (d) to the 
department which lost the case was a late alteration to the bill to increase its deterrent effect. 
See 126 CONG. REc. 28,845 (1980) (statement of Sen. Domenici) (stating that the earlier 
version provided for payment from a general fund); National Legal Aid and Defender Assn., 
Commentary: The Equal Access to Justice Act, 15 CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 1021, 1021 (1982) 
("Awards made under section 2412(d) ... should be paid directly by the agency from its 
unrestricted appropriation."). Discretionary awards under§§ 2412(a) and 2412(b) are paid 
by the General Accounting Office. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2412(c), 2414 (1988). 
182. Delay increases the administrative expenses generated by the bankruptcy estate. All 
actual and necessary expenses of maintaining the estate are administrative, see 11 U.S.C. 
§ 503 (1988), and are paid before creditors and the debtor receive any funds. See 11 U.S.C. 
§ 507 (1988). Therefore, delay prevents maximal distribution of the estate, which is a goal of 
the bankruptcy system. See WHITE & NIMMER, supra note 165, at 52. 
183. See H.R. REP. No. 1418, supra note 2, at 9, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4988 
(noting that "it is more practical to endure an injustice than to contest it" if the cost of 
contesting is high). 
184. See id. ("Where compliance is coerced, precedent may be established on the basis of 
an uncontested order rather than the thoughtful presentation and consideration of opposing 
views."); S. REP. No. 253, supra note 88, at 7 ("By allowing a decision to contest Government 
action to be based on the merits of the case rather than the cost of litigating, [the EAJA) 
helps assure that administrative decisions reflect informed deliberation."). Although the 
danger of ill-conceived legal precedent is slim in the bankruptcy context because agencies do 
not have rulemaking power in that arena, there is a risk of institutional precedent, where a 
course of conduct may be established without informed deliberation. See id. at 7. 
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often, government decisions to litigate went unchallenged.185 With-
out the threat of challenges by citizens, governmental power was 
only limited by its own discretion. Congress believed this was an 
insufficient check on government authority.186 The citizens who do 
challenge the government and force litigation thereby provide a 
type of public service, especially when the government's position is 
unjustified.187 Granting the bankruptcy courts the ability to shift 
fees under the BAJA will help test and thereby improve the quality 
of government positions in bankruptcy cases. 
III. ALTERNATIVES TO BANKRUPTCY COURT JURISDICTION 
UNDER THE CURRENT BAJA 
Three possible alternatives to bankruptcy court jurisdiction over 
BAJA petitions exist. First, bankruptcy courts could forward pro-
posed findings of fact and conclusions of law concerning BAJA pe-
titions to the district courts for final judgment.188 Second, 
bankruptcy courts could obtain the consent of the parties to exer-
cise BAJA power.189 Third, Congress could again amend the BAJA 
definition of court.190 
This Part argues that none of these options provides a solution 
preferable to interpreting the BAJA accurately according to its lan-
guage, history, and purposes. Section III.A argues that forwarding 
proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law regarding the 
BAJA issue to the district court is inefficient, expensive, and runs 
counter to the purposes of the BAJA. Section 111.B argues that 
having the bankruptcy court request the consent of the parties to 
the courts' exercise of BAJA authority is unworkable in practice. 
185. Congress amended the EAJA in 1985 to state: " '[P]osition of the United States' 
means, in addition to the position taken by the United States in the civil action, the action or 
failure to act by the agency upon which the civil action is based.'' Act of Aug. 5, 1985, Pub. L. 
No. 99-80, § 2(c)(2), 99 Stat. 183, 185 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(D)). The House 
Judiciary explained the amendment as follows: "[T]he definition of 'position of the United 
States' ... necessarily includes an evaluation of the facts that led the agency to bring the 
action against the private party ••. .'' H.R. REP. No. 120, supra note 142, at 13, reprinted in 
1985 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 141. The legislative history to the enactment of the EAJA in 1980 also 
indicates a desire to include the decision to bring suit within the realm of EAJA regulation. 
See H.R. REP. No. 1418, supra note 2, at 11, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4989-90. 
186. One report states, "This kind of truncated justice undermines the integrity of the 
decisionmaking process." H.R. REP. No. 1418, supra note 2, at 10, reprinted in 1980 
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4988; see also S. REP. No. 253, supra note 88, at 5. 
187. S. REP. No. 253, supra note 88, at 5-6. In passing the EAJA, Congress expressed a 
belief that those entities that provide this service and thereby help define the limits of federal 
authority should not bear the cost of providing such an important service alone. H.R. REP. 
No. 1418, supra note 2, at 10, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4988-89. 
188. See Gower v. Farmers Home Admin. (In re Davis), 899 F.2d 1136, 1140-41 (11th 
Cir.), cert denied, 498 U.S. 981 (1990); see also 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(l) (1988). 
189. Davis, 899 F.2d at 1141-42. 
190. See Sabino, supra note 114, at 487-89. 
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Section IIl.C argues that simply waiting for Congress again to 
amend the EAJA definition of court is unfaithful to the statute and 
confuses the roles of the judiciary and the legislature. This Part 
concludes that the lack of acceptable substitutes for direct bank-
ruptcy jurisdiction over EAJA applications provides the final indi-
cation that Congress likely intended to include bankruptcy courts 
within the EAJA's jurisdictional grant.· 
A. Forwarding Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law to the District Court for Approval 
The Eleventh Circuit in Gower v. Farmers Home Administration 
(In re Davis)191 suggested that the bankruptcy courts may forward 
EAJA petitions to the district court according to the procedure pro-
vided by 28 U.S.C. § 157.192 Under this procedure, bankruptcy 
courts may forward proposed findings of fact and conclusions 
of law to the district court for de novo review. The procedure per-
mits the district court, an Article III court unquestionably vested 
with EAJA jurisdiction, to issue the final order regarding the fee 
application.193 This suggestion mirrors the system currently used 
when "noncore"194 disputes arise before the bankruptcy 
191. 899 F.2d 1136 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 981 (1990). 
192. 899 F.2d at 1140-44; see 28 U.S.C. § 157(b) (1988). 
193. 899 F.2d at 1141. 
194. See 28 U.S.C. 157(c) (1988). In a "noncore" proceeding, absent consent of the par-
ties to bankruptcy court adjudication, 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(2) (1988), the bankruptcy court 
hears the case, but does not decide it The bankruptcy court submits proposed findings of 
fact and conclusions of law to the district court for de novo review of any finding to which 
one of the parties objects. 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(l) (1988). The district court then enters final 
judgment. 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(l) (1988). 
The Davis court refers to the EAJA application as a noncore proceeding, 899 F.2d at 
1140-41. This holding coincides with the Davis court's finding that bankruptcy courts may 
not award EAJA fees, but the conclusion that EAJA applications are not core proceedings is 
not perfectly obvious. At least two courts have held that a request for fees under the EAJA's 
sister statute, 26 U.S.C. § 7430 (1988), is a core matter. See Kreidle v. Department of Treas-
ury, IRS (In re Kreidle), 145 B.R. 1007, 1010 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1992) (relying on 28 U.S.C. 
§ 157(b)(2)(0) (1988)); In re Chambers, 140 B.R. 233, 238 (N.D. Ill. 1992) (relying on 28 
U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(B) (1988)). Furthermore, the courts which have awarded EAJA fees 
must have considered the application a core matter. See, e.g., O'Connor v. United States 
Dept. of Energy, 942 F.2d 771 (10th Cir. 1991) (reversing denial of fees on jurisdictional 
grounds); United States Small Business Admin. v. Esmond (In re Esmond), 752 F.2d 1106 
(5th Cir. 1985) (remanding to bankruptcy court for a determination of the appropriateness of 
an EAJA award). Given the language of28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(0), which designates "other 
proceedings affecting the liquidation of the assets of the estate" as core matters, and the fact 
that EAJA petitions surely affect asset liquidation, the reasoning of the Kreidle court seems 
to give the correct result. 
Another way to consider the problem is to recognize that the distinction between core 
and noncore is Congress's attempt to rectify the jurisdiction problem exposed in Northern 
Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipeline Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982). See Robert L. Ordin 
& Michael L. Cook, Bankruptcy Jurisdiction Under the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal 
Judgeship Act of 1984, in BANKRUPTCY LmGATION MANUAL 1, 73 (Michael L. Cook ed., 
1991). For a discussion of Marathon, see supra notes 108-19 and accompanying text. As 
demonstrated earlier, there is no constitutional objection to the bankruptcy court adjudicat-
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courts.195 
Such a procedure presents two difficulties. First, it requires an 
adjudication by a court that is one step removed from the parties 
and the administration of the case. A court ruling on an BAJA 
application must exercise considerable judgment. Courts may not 
shift fees if the position of the United States was "substantially jus-
tified"196 or if "special circumstances make an award unjust."197 A 
district court may not be able to perform an effective de novo re-
view without firsthand information. The bankruptcy court, on the 
other hand, is intimately familiar with the totality of the case, in-
cluding the legal positions and conduct of the parties. The bank-
ruptcy court is therefore the best judicial body to determine 
whether an award is warranted. As a result, the de novo review 
performed by the district court may amount to little more than a 
rubber stamp of the bankruptcy court's proposed findings.198 In 
such an instance, the procedure serves no purpose but to increase 
the legal costs. This result conflicts with one of the purposes of the 
EAJA - to reduce the deterrent effect of legal fees on the average 
citizen's willingness to litigate against the federal government.199 
Second, requiring the district court to repeat the work of the 
bankrµptcy court misuses judicial resources. Even if the district 
court engages in a pro forma review of the bankruptcy court's find-
ings, the procedure under section 157 of the bankruptcy code con-
sumes judicial resources.200 The federal district courts are already 
overburdened201 and should not be saddled with additional respon-
ing EAJA questions. See supra notes 111-14 and accompanying text. Therefore, EAJA peti-
tions should be considered core matters that bankruptcy courts can hear directly. 
195. See generally DAVID G. EPSTEIN ET AL., BANKRUPTCY 865-66 (1992). 
196. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(l)(A) (1988). 
197. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(l)(A) (1988). 
198. See WHITE & NIMMER, supra note 165, at 97 ("In practice, one suspects de novo 
review will be pro forma."); Lawrence P. King, Jurisdiction and Procedure Under the Bank-
ruptcy Amendments of 1984, 38 VAND. L. REv. 675, 681-82 (1985) ("In practical terms, how-
ever, the nonarticle III court's proposed findings and conclusions will be the findings and 
conclusions. 'Consider' and 'review' will disintegrate into rubber stamped acceptances of the 
bankruptcy court's findings and conclusions."). 
199. See H.R. REP. No. 1418, supra note 2, at 5, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4984 
("The bill rests on the premise that certain (parties] may be deterred from seeking review of, 
or defending against unreasonable governmental action because of the expense involved."); 
125 CoNo. REc. 21,436 (1979) (statement of Sen. Dole) ("Ironically, it appears that Ameri-
can Justice has become too costly for the average American budget."). 
200. On the notoriously complex nature of bankruptcy jurisdiction, see Steven W. 
Rhodes, Eight Statutory Causes of Delay and Expense in Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Cases, 61 
AM. BANKR. LJ. 287, 299-302 (1993). 
201. As of March 31, 1993, 220,633 civil cases were pending before the district courts, 
slightly less than the 228,468 cases which were terminated in the 12 prior months combined. 
WORKLOAD STATISTICS, supra note 12, at 2. The number of suits pending before the district 
courts was virtually unchanged from March 31, 1992. Id. at 19. Thus, the district courts face 
approximately a full year's backlog of civil cases. For an analysis of the district court's crimi-
nal caseload, see infra note 202. 
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sibilities better handled by the bankruptcy courts. Furthermore, 
because of the busy schedules of the district courts, it is conceivable 
that a request from a bankruptcy court for a de novo review could 
linger indefinitely, particularly because under the mandate of the 
Speedy Trial Act civil suits are relegated to second priority.202 In 
addition, district courts rarely want to hear bankruptcy disputes.203 
The resulting delay and aggravation to the courts caused by for-
warding proposed findings to the district courts204 ill serves the pur-
poses of the EAJA2os and the bankruptcy system.206 
It is true that the bankruptcy system must tolerate the additional 
expenses of this noncore adjudication process when the bankruptcy 
court lacks constitutional authority to accommodate the mandate of 
Marathon that "the power to adjudicate 'private rights' must be 
vested in an Art[icle] III court."207 But no such constitutional re-
quirement exists with respect to EAJA motions.208 Because Con-
gress gave the bankruptcy courts EAJA authority in 1980,209 there 
is no reason to endure the additional expense of forwarding EAJA 
petitions to the district courts. 
B. Obtaining the Consent of the Parties to Adjudication by the 
Bankruptcy Court 
Relying on the consent of the parties to ba:p.kruptcy court juris-
diction over EAJA petitions is an unworkable solution because a 
government party, in furtherance of its self-interest, will likely 
never give its consent.210 The EAJA requires the losing federal 
agency to pay the litigation expenses of a prevailing nongovem-
ment party unless the government can prove that its position was 
202. Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161-64 (1988) (requiring expedited procedures for 
criminal trials). As of March 31, 1993, 46,358 criminal cases were pending in the district 
courts. WORKLOAD STATISTICS, supra note 12, at 34. During the prior twelve months, 43,698 
criminal cases were terminated, id., suggesting a backlog of a full year. 
203. DOUGLAS G. BAIRD, THE ELEMENTS OF BANKRUPTCY 21 (1992). In fact, the district 
courts' distaste for bankruptcy cases is one of the reasons the bankruptcy courts were created 
as a separate judicial body in the BRA. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1978), 
reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 5976. · 
204. One commentator identifies this procedure as a cause of expense and delay in bank-
ruptcy proceedings. See Rhodes, supra note 200, at 299-302. 
205. See supra section 11.C. 
206. See supra note 182 and accompanying text. 
207. Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipeline Co., 458 U.S. 50, 77 (1982). 
208. See supra notes 111-14 and accompanying text. 
209. See supra section 11.B.1. 
210. Even the proponents of this view admit that it is unlikely to be used. Professor 
Sabino writes, "while it is debatable whether any federal agency would consent to such an 
exercise by the bankruptcy court, it is, nevertheless, feasible." Sabino, supra note 114, at 487. 
In enacting the EAJA, however, Congress certainly intended that parties who litigate and 
prevail against the government, when the government has no substantial justification for its 
position, have more than a "feasible" remedy. 
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substantially justified.211 Therefore, a government party that con-
sents to bankruptcy court jurisdiction incurs additional risk for the 
litigation costs of the opposing party, but receives no reward. With 
nothing to gain, the government party would be foolish to consent 
to the exercise of EAJA jurisdiction by the bankruptcy court.212 
This alternative is untenable because it places the power to consent 
to bankruptcy court authority with a party that will only harm itself 
by exercising such authority. 
C. Amending the EAJA Definition of Court 
A third alternative is a congressional amendment to the EAJA 
to include the bankruptcy courts within the BAJA definition of 
court. Anthony Sabino argues that Congress should again amend 
the EAJA to include the bankruptcy court within its definition of 
court, 213 following the amendments that included the Claims Court 
and the Court of Veterans Appeals.214 He reasons that "Congress 
created the EAJA, thus, it is best suited to modify the BAJA to 
address new dynamics in its application."21s 
Although amending the EAJA's definition of court to include 
the bankruptcy court would obviously solve the problem of the 
EAJA's jurisdictional scope with respect to the bankruptcy courts, 
the prospect of amendment does not alleviate the courts' responsi-
bility to interpret the law as it is written. Congress cannot be ex-
pected to address every new dynamic in the application of each law 
it has enacted.216 Congress' failure to respond to the circuit split on 
the issue of bankruptcy court jurisdiction over the BAJA may sim-
ply be the result of a need to focus on more pressing matters. 
211. See 28 U.S.C. § 2412( d)(5) (1988). The government party bears the burden of proof 
on this issue. Gutierrez v. Sullivan, 953 F.2d 579, 584-85 (10th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. 
Ct. 2064 (1993); Cummings v. Sullivan, 950 F.2d 492, 494-95 (7th Cir. 1991). 
212. The government party might be willing to consent to an EAJA adjudication in re-
turn for some other advantage, such as a factual stipulation or waiver of procedural right. 
The EAJA, however, was passed to mitigate the effect of the government's inherent, yet 
coercive litigation advantages, see S. REP. No. 253, supra note 88, at 5, and to encourage 
adjudications on the merits. H.R. REP. No. 1418, supra note 2, at 10, reprinted in 1980 
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4988. The EAJA represents an attempt to improve citizens' access to the 
court system. See S. REP. No. 253, supra note 88, at 7. The possibility of a government party 
using access to this supposedly access-creating Act as a bargaining chip violates the purpose 
of the EAJA. 
213. Sabino, supra note 114, at 488. 
214. See supra notes 133, 147 and accompanying text. 
215. Sabino, supra note 114, at 488. 
216. As the Supreme Court has observed, "Congressional inaction lacks 'persuasive sig-
nificance' because 'several equally tenable inferences' may be drawn from such inaction, 'in-
cluding the inference that the existing legislation already incorporated the offered change.'" 
Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp., 496 U.S. 633, 650 (1990) (quoting United States v. 
Wise, 370 U.S. 405, 411 (1962)). For a general discussion of the meaning of congressional 
inaction, see William N. Eskridge, Jr., Interpreting Legislative Inaction, 87 MICH. L. REV. 67 
(1988). 
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Courts must interpret the EAJA currently before them, and as this 
Note has demonstrated, the text, history, and purposes of the stat-
ute all indicate that bankruptcy courts already have the authority to 
shift fees against the federal government. 
CONCLUSION 
Congress enacted the EAJA to increase access to the court sys-
tem by encouraging litigants to challenge unreasonable government 
positions. The bankruptcy courts are not immune to unreasonable 
government positions. The coercive nature of an adversary with the 
vast resources of the United States weighs heavily on a party trying 
to salvage its estate or contract rights in the bankruptcy court. The 
chance to assert one's rights without the additional expense of liti-
gation encourages parties to assert their rights. Bankruptcy court 
authority over EAJA petitions serves the purposes of the EAJA. 
In addition, the language of the statute that grants authority to 
"any court" having subject-matter jurisdiction firmly supports 
bankruptcy court authority over the BAJA. The confounding his-
tory of the EAJA, the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, the transi-
tion period, Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon 
Pipeline Co., the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship 
Act of 1984, and the subsequent amendments to the EAJA's defini-
tion of "court" create considerable ambiguity, particularly with re-
spect to the EAJA's legislative history. A careful examination of 
each event within its historical context, however, leads to the single 
conclusion that Congress intended the bankruptcy courts to have 
EAJA power. By examining the history of the EAJA, this Note has 
reconciled the seeming direct contradiction between the language 
of the EAJA and its legislative history. The reconciliation points to 
bankruptcy court jurisdiction over EAJA petitions. 
It is true that Congress has remained silent on the issue, despite 
a controversy in the courts. This silence, however, does not indicate 
congressional opposition to bankruptcy court authority. In fact, 
Congress has not subsequently refuted its original extension of 
EAJA power to the bankruptcy courts. The arguments that rely on 
Congress's silence to exclude the bankruptcy courts from EAJA au-
thority simply misinterpret Congress's actions since the EAJA's 
enactment. 
Finally, alternative ways for bankruptcy litigants to recover their 
fees if they prevail against the government are implausible due to 
their expense and impracticability. The very existence of these pro-
posals suggests that even those who believe the EAJA does not 
grant the bankruptcy courts the ability to shift fees believe that liti-
gants should be able to recover their fees in the bankruptcy courts. 
Instead of looking elsewhere, however, courts need only rely upon 
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the text, history, and purposes of the BAJA itself to recognize the 
authority of bankruptcy courts to shift fees and costs against the 
United States. 
